The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

SPARTA'S RIPOSTE 91
Persian aid. But Lichas was surely one of the Spartans who soon
negotiated a third treaty with the Persians in which even Sparta's
strongest defender admits "the liberators have conceded Asia to the
King. " 9 ' When, after the negotiation of that treaty, the Milesians drove
out a Persian garrison with the warm approval of their Greek allies,
Lichas was displeased and told them that they "and all the other cities
in the King's land should be slaves to him, in a moderate way."•' It
was hardly, therefore, the love for Greek freedom that moved Lichas
to speak as he did. Perhaps, in light of the outcome of the conference,
it might be thought that the bold and provocative speech was meant
to break off the alliance with Persia and allow Sparta to pursue an
independent policy in lonia. But Thucydides tells us that the subject
of the conference was not only revision of the earlier agreements but
also "how the rest of the war might be fought to the greatest advantage
of both sides," and after all, Lichas did conclude his remarks with a
demand for the negotiation of a new treaty. 93
Probably Lichas took a hard line with the intention of establishing
a high base from which to negotiate a better treaty. The language of
the previous agreements, with their clear abandonment of the Greeks
of Asia to the Persians, was embarrassing at the very least, and the
lack of a specific provision for Persian payment and support already
had proved to be a serious problem. Lichas must have thought that
his inexperienced and unimpressive predecessors had simply not been
tough enough and that a hard line on lofty moral grounds from a
veteran statesman of high personal prestige would have better results.
If those were his expectations, they were quickly and rudely disappointed,
for Tissaphemes was offended and angered and walked out
of the meeting."' Without knowing it, Lichas had lent credibility to
Alcibiades' advice that the Spartans could not be trusted as allies, for
they, unlike the Athenians, seemed wedded to the idea of liberating
the Greeks under Persian rule. 95 In any case, it would be unwise for
Tissaphernes to negotiate while the Spartans were in such a mood. It
would be better to let them stew, without the benefit of Persian sup-
91
8.58; Lcwis, Sparta and Persia, 107.
928.84.5.
91
8·43-2; 43·4·
94 8.43+ Some scholars have suggested that the satrap's reaction was feigned, but
there is no reason to think so. Tissaphernes was not accustomed to hearing such language
from Spanan negotiators.
9.i8.p.