The Fall of the Athenian Empire-(A New History of the Peloponnesian War) Donald Kagan - (1987)

CYRUS, LYSANDF.R, AND THE FALL OF ALCIBIADES 323
The Athenians voted to send Conon from Andros to take over command
of the fleet at Samos. It is not clear whether he waited to hand
over his responsibilities to his replacement or departed beforehand."'
In either case, he had no intention of retnrning to Athens, where many
private lawsuits had been brought against him and his enemies were
many and strong."' Nor could he stay on Samos, for the army there
had turned against him. 123 Also, the escape hatches to Sparta and Persia
had been closed. However, he had foreseen the danger and prepared
a retreat for himself in a fortified castle he had built on the Gallipoli
Peninsula during his years in service in the Hellespont, and to it he
went in voluntary exile. 124 The removal of Alcibiades from Athens and
from the command of her forces is generally thought to have been
disastrous for Athens. Plutarch represents the Athenians after their
defeat in the war as bemoaning their mistakes, of which the greatest
was their second rejection of Alcibiades, their "ablest and most skilled
general," and even the restrained and judicious Thucydides endorses
his military talents."' Most modern scholars have agreed and regarded
his final removal as the turning point in the last phase of the war.'"
The record, however, does not support such judgments. Alcibiades
accomplished nothing of note as a military or naval commander until
his service in the straits between 411 and 408. There, he showed
himself to be a good commander, especially of cavalry, and a capable
naval officer, but he did not demonstrate any extraordinary ability as
a strategist or tactician. The ablest commander in the campaigns in
reads "Cleophon indicted Alcibiades," without mentioning the charge, date, or occasion.
Gilberr (Beitriige, 366) suggests that the charge was treason ('rrpo8o