Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

3.23
quences to the public following sabotage at a facility handling these materials. The level
of the potential risk will in turn be determined by the characteristics of these possible
targets and the kind and degree of threat anticipated.
Safeguard requirements for the waste management facilities considered in this Statement
were characterized based on the attractiveness and accessibility of the wastes as potential
targets for theft or sabotage. Attractiveness depends on composition and physical form of
the waste. The important aspects of composition are the concentration of fissionable mater-
ials and radioactivity. Radioactive wastes are not considered good sources of fissile mat-
erial for the manufacture of a weapon because of the small quantities of fissile materials
per unit volume. Of the waste forms considered in this Statement, only spent fuel contains
attractive quantities of such materials. However, the physical condition of spent fuel
waste requires sophisticated processing in order to recover the fissile material. Some
highly radioactive nuclear wastes may be in a form that would be attractive to an adversary
as a source of material that is readily dispersable and, because of the health hazard, could
be used to threaten and extort gains from industries or public agencies.
In evaluating the potential for sabotage, consideration was given to design features
that could significantly reduce the consequences of sabotage and contribute to the protec-
tion of this material. These design features include the thick shielding around the more
radioactive process vessels (walls up to 2 m thick); tornado, earthquake and flood protec-
tion requirements for all key process facilities; monitored cells and operations; and equip-
ment for detecting and coping with releases of radioactivity. These features generally
result in facilities that are unattractive targets for sabotage.
Accessibility of the waste materials was also considered. Factors affecting accessi-
bility include: 1) quantity available at a given location, 2) the degree of isolation of
the location, and 3) the complexity of the devices necessary for handling the material
(e.g., whether they are operated manually or automatically and whether special knowledge or
skills are required).
The final element considered in assessing safeguard requirements was the threat level
of potential adversaries. The overall safeguard risk was assessed by considering the above
elements--the attractiveness of the material, its accessibility, and the threat level--in
the following relationship:
Risk to Society = Frequency x Success Rate x Consequences
The frequency of attempts, related in part to the attractiveness of material; the success
rate, related in part to the availability of the material; and the consequences, measured
by effects on the public and the environment, are also all affected by the skills, motiva-
tion, financial backing and intrepidness of potential adversaries. All contribute to the
risk to society. The relationship shows that if one or more of these factors is very small,
the risk to society is also small.
Frequency and success probabilities are difficult to define. However, safeguards mea-
sures normally in place for the vital facilities and vital materials of the fuel cycle are