23.04.2013 Views

Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

3-39 3-40<br />

Comment<br />

'umber -b-<br />

Comment<br />

Number<br />

i.17 p. -. 3.1.137<br />

The section on long-term impacts is devoted entirely to accidents that may<br />

seem most unlikely to occur in practice .... the calculated number <strong>of</strong><br />

health effects attributable to this accident would range from 1x10 4 breach the repository, most <strong>of</strong> which are presented as being so improbable<br />

to<br />

3xl0 5 that they are unlikely to ever occur. There is no discussion presented <strong>of</strong><br />

.<br />

expected long-term impact. If the facility is sited, filled and sealed<br />

according to plan, what will the long-term consequences <strong>of</strong> this action be<br />

GEIS goes on to multiply these figures by 1/100 as the probability <strong>of</strong><br />

failure <strong>of</strong> waste containment and by 4x10l 11 in the absence <strong>of</strong> unlikely accidents? This question is discussed partially<br />

in Appendix I but the discussjons are not presented in the text <strong>of</strong> the<br />

GEIS as projected impacts <strong>of</strong> the action.<br />

/yr as the probability <strong>of</strong> a new<br />

fault intersecting the repository to arrive at insignificant risk levels.<br />

The probability <strong>of</strong> an existing fault becoming permeable should also be<br />

considered.<br />

3.i.18 . 3.1.133.j<br />

Releases are estimated for four hypothetical accident sequences. The<br />

Research and Development<br />

numbers associated with the releases are presented by the GEIS as "what<br />

if" calculations, without discussion <strong>of</strong> why these sequences are important<br />

except to say that they are "believed most representative" <strong>of</strong> release<br />

events. How these events were chosen and why they are believed to be<br />

representative and to bound the impact <strong>of</strong> long-term consequences should be<br />

discussed. discussed<br />

3.j.1 General Comment<br />

It would seem advisable, if not already considered, to gather information<br />

regarding the long-term stability <strong>of</strong> boreholes, wells, and other deep rock<br />

penetrations in regions considered favorable for repository location.<br />

These observations can provide additional clues on assessing the stability<br />

<strong>of</strong><br />

'r<br />

the repository location. This would be useful in assessing the host<br />

3.1.19 p. 3.1.138<br />

media as well as that <strong>of</strong> the overlying and underlying formations especially<br />

when considering the Very Deep Hole concept <strong>of</strong> waste isolation. Pertubations<br />

References relevant to this discussion and not cited include: <strong>of</strong> the earth's near-surface are readily detectable in both cased and<br />

1. K.A. Solomon, R.C. Erdmann and D. Okrent, "Estimate <strong>of</strong> Hazards <strong>of</strong> a<br />

uncased holes through sheared, ruptured, and squeezed boreholes and casings.<br />

Nuclear Reactor from the Random Impact <strong>of</strong> Meteorities," Nucl.<br />

25. 68 (1975).<br />

Technical, 3.j.2 p. 3.1.237<br />

There is no discussion <strong>of</strong> research needs in the hydrologic transport aspects<br />

<strong>of</strong> geologic disposal. Of prime importance are the chemical and thermal<br />

2. K.A. Solomon, R.C. Erdmann, T.E. Hicks and D. Okrent, "Estimates <strong>of</strong> interactions involving dissolved wastes and the natural rock.<br />

the Hazards to a Nuclear Reactor from Random Impact <strong>of</strong> Meteorities,"<br />

USCL-NEG-7426, University <strong>of</strong> California at Los Angeles (March 1979). 3.k General<br />

3..20 . 3.1.150 to 3.1.155 3.k. p. 1.3<br />

"The annual doses to a maximum individual associated with the breach <strong>of</strong> a The underground firing <strong>of</strong> nuclear explosives results in the formation <strong>of</strong><br />

salt repository are three to ten times the permissible annual dose for vitrified debris, due to the solidification <strong>of</strong> molten and vaporized rock.<br />

occupational exposures ... Thus the calculated doses and consequences Thousands <strong>of</strong> tons <strong>of</strong> such vitrified debris have been in place for periods<br />

<strong>of</strong> up to 25 years, mostly in tuff at the Nevada Test Site, but also in

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!