Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

4.113
Physical protection features required by Federal regulations are expected to provide
adequate safeguards. Safeguards contingency plans in these regulations for licensed facili-
ties will include NRC-approved arrangements for support from local law enforcement personnel
if there is a serious threat. An adequate response force will be able to engage and con-
tain the intruders in less time than is required for the intruders to gain access, remove
fuel elements from the storage location, transfer them to a shielded container, place them
on a vehicle and leave the site. A single fuel assembly weighs more than one-quarter metric
ton and a hoist or crane operated from behind heavy shielding is required to move it. Dis-
assembly to obtain individual fuel rods, which could be transferred by more readily obtain-
able light equipment, would be a much more time-consuming operation. The disassembly would
have to be done remotely, behind heavy shielding or under water.
These same measures also deny fuel storage facility access to saboteurs. A detailed
study (Voiland et al. 1974) of the safeguards risks associated with water basin storage of
spent fuel concluded that the stored irradiated fuel at the facility under consideration is
not amenable to a credible sabotage event that would endanger the public health and safety.
The safeguards measures assumed for that case are typical of those required for the licensed
facilities.
4.10.1.3 Safeguards Requirements for Transport of Spent Fuel
Spent fuel is more vulnerable to theft and acts of sabotage during transport than at
fixed sites because it is more accessible. The measures proposed to protect against diver-
sion and sabotage of shipments of spent fuel reflect this potential threat (10 CFR 73).
The level of physical protection required for shipments of spent fuel elements, estab-
lished by the NRC in an interim rulemaking (10 CFR 73 1979), was based on a study by Sandia
laboratories (1977). Specific requirements were included to protect the public against
sabotage of spent fuel in transit by truck or rail, with particular concern for urban areas.
Theft of spent fuel to obtain the fissionable material is not sufficiently credible to
warrant additional requirements for this specific threat (see Section 4.10.1.2). Theft of
this material as a part of an extortion attempt would be limited to the length of time law
enforcement personnel would need to locate the stolen cask. Such material in a cask is
detectable by aerial radiation surveys and the fact that detection would be imminent would
deter any lengthy extortion scheme.
Prediction of detection is based upon the capability of the Department of Energy's
Aerial Radiological Monitoring system (ARMS) of which two are in continuous service (Doyle