Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

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1976). It is assumed that one of these or an equivalent system would be available. The
system consists of a forty-sensor array with a computer-assisted data analyzer, a printer
and a plotter mounted in a helicopter.(a)
4.10.2 Safeguards Requirements for the Reprocessing Fuel Cycle
In the reprocessing fuel cycle large quantities of fissionable and radioactive material
are handled in a fuel reprocessing facility, and the physical protection requirements for
the facility and vital materials within it are specified in 10 CFR 73. The general features
of those requirements are identified in Section 3.7. Similar requirements would be enforced
at the plutonium-uranium mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants.
The waste materials produced at these facilities are unattractive as targets of theft
compared to the fissionable material in the facilities. In addition, all waste treatment
operations and storage of highly radioactive wastes would be protected in "vital" areas.
Consequently, these materials would be inaccessible to any but authorized persons, and suc-
cessful intrusion, theft and sabotage are improbable.
4.10.2.1 Safeguards Requirements for the Treatment of Reprocessing Wastes
High-level waste is not a potential source of fissionable material and could only be a
target for theft or sabotage to disperse or threaten dispersal of radioactive material. The
HLW is an unattractive target because of its high radiation level and inaccessibility. All
handling, storage, and treatment in the facility occurs by remote operations in shielded,
isolated vessels and cells.
Before it is solidified, HLW may be stored as a solution in shielded tanks in which it
is accessible only by remote means. Its intense radioactivity and high heat release rates
and the maze of facility support equipment would make unauthorized transfer of HLW to a
shielded container and its removal offsite an incredible accomplishment, particularly since
extensive physical protection measures would also have to be overcome. For similar reasons,
dispersal of HLW onsite by explosives is not credible, although the concentration of radio-
active fission products in this waste may make it appear to be an attractive target.
With inside assistance, physical protection and access control measures could possibly
be compromised, and sabotage of the storage facility could occur. One consequence could be
a disruption of the waste cooling system and/or electrical system. Self-heating would cause
the contents to begin to boil in about 7 hours and boil to dryness in about 100 hours. This
scenario is not considered credible if the planned safeguards measures and the safety design
features of the facility (which are included to ensure continuity of HLW cooling) are
(a) The ability of an aerial radiation survey to detect a spent fuel cask that has not been
breached and is located inside a facility depends upon the facility. In a singlestoried,
conventionally constructed warehouse or its structural equivalent, the
radiation from the cask would be readily detected in an aerial survey. If the truck
and fuel cask were in an underground garage under a multi-storied building surrounded
by multi-storied buildings, an aerial survey may not be effective. However, a mobile
surface survey would be effective in detecting this source.