Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

5.101
5.7 SAFEGUARDS INCLUDING PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL
Facilities associatedwith geologic repositories will employ safeguards and physical
protection measures commensurate with the potential risks to society associated with the
waste material (see discussion in Section 4.10), and the surface facilities at these sites
would receive the principal emphasis. After emplacement in the geologic repository, the
spent fuel and wastes would be very inaccessible for theft or diversion. Sabotage, if
achieved, would have a minimum effect on the safety and health of the public because of the
containment of the waste in a solid material that is difficult to pulverize and disperse.
Nevertheless, sabotage of the facility and the waste packages must be guarded against until
repository closure.
5.7.1 Geologic Disposal of Spent Fuel
Safeguards, including physical protection measures afforded vital material, would be
required for the spent fuel elements as they are received, inspected, and made ready for
geologic placement. This material is not attractive for theft or sabotage for the reasons
given previously (Section 4.10.1.2), and in addition it becomes more inaccessible at this
facility. Moreover, the currently required physical protection measures include controlled
access through two barriers plus an adequate security force, and a contingency plan
(response force) as required by the Federal regulations (10 CFR 73). Records of waste dis-
position to provide traceability from origin to final disposal will be maintained
(43 CFR 195 1978).
After emplacement and closure in the geologic repository, the spent fuel would be
essentially inaccessible for sabotage or theft. A successful intrusion and theft of HLW
containers or sabotage in place would be unlikely because of the limited access to the con-
tainers, the operational control over entry, and the physical security provided at the
access points in the surface facility. After repository closure the waste would be avail-
able only through re-excavation or mining. Theft or sabotage after closure and decommissioning
does not appear credible because the effort would be readily detectable.
5.7.2 Geologic Disposal of Solidified High-Level Waste and Transuranic Wastes
The physical protection required for the surface facility handling these wastes
includes measures to protect the facility and material from intrusion, theft and sabotage.
These measures would be similar to those in any facility handling moderately hazardous mate-
rial. At the repository these materials would be quite inaccessible to the public, and in
a form that is not attractive for theft or sabotage. The solidified high-level waste would
be too radioactive for adversaries to handle except remotely behind heavy shielding which,
as shown in earlier discussions, makes this material inherently unattractive. Routine
accountability programs would record the transfer of this material to its geologic disposal
location. After geologic emplacement this material would be relatively inaccessible for
theft. Sabotage, if ever attempted, would have little affect on the public because of the
containment of the waste. After closure, theft or sabotage does not appear credible
because mining or re-excavation would be required to gain access. Such an operation would
be difficult to conceal and could be easily prevented.