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Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

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4.112<br />

4.10 SAFEGUARDS INCLUDING PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR PREDISPOSAL OPERATIONS<br />

Regulations similar to those already in place to protect the public from theft <strong>of</strong><br />

nuclear material and from sabotage at licensed nuclear facilities are expected to apply to<br />

operations at waste management facilities. The probable safeguard requirements for predis-<br />

posal waste management facilities are described in this section.<br />

4.10.1 Safeguards Requirements for the Once-Through Cycle<br />

Safeguards measures, including physical protection, required for currently licensed<br />

nuclear facilities are expected to be adequate for safeguards and physical protection for<br />

the once-through cycle. Spent fuel and the facilities designed to manage this material are<br />

not expected to require additional safeguards.<br />

4.10.1.1 Spent Fuel Treatment and Packaging Safeguards Requirements<br />

The susceptibility <strong>of</strong> the spent fuel handling operation to theft and sabotage <strong>of</strong> the<br />

fuel elements is reduced as packaging and treatment operations <strong>of</strong> the fuel elements proceed.<br />

The spent-fuel elements and all treatment and packaging facilities handling this material<br />

will be physically protected as required by Federal regulations for vital areas (see Sec-<br />

tion 3.2.9 or 10 CFR 70, 73). All <strong>of</strong> the auxiliary systems for spent fuel handling will be<br />

similarly protected because they are part <strong>of</strong> the same facility.<br />

If the spent fuel is simply encapsulated for disposal as in the example process for<br />

this Statement, the spent fuel elements become less attractive and less accessible targets<br />

for sabotage. In addition, operating safety features inherent in the design <strong>of</strong> facilities<br />

licensed to process spent fuel elements contribute significantly to safeguarding this<br />

material.<br />

If the spent fuel is chopped and encapsulated, none <strong>of</strong> the additional steps required<br />

in this process significantly increase the susceptibility <strong>of</strong> the facility, equipment or<br />

target material to theft or sabotage.<br />

If the spent fuel is dissolved and converted to glass, the physical protection require-<br />

ments and the relative unattractiveness and inaccessibility <strong>of</strong> the material make it an<br />

unlikely target for theft or sabotage. The same protective environmental and control mea-<br />

sures identified above are iresent in this facility to provide required safeguards features.<br />

4.10.1.2 Safeguards Requirements for Spent Fuel Storage<br />

Spent fuel is neither easily accessible nor an attractive enough source <strong>of</strong> fissile<br />

material to encourage theft.. The plutonium concentration is low and the fuel elements are<br />

very radioactive; massive shielding <strong>of</strong> steel, lead, concrete or several feet <strong>of</strong> water is<br />

required at all times. Separation <strong>of</strong> the plutonium requires complex chemical processes car-<br />

ried out in remotely operated, shielded processing equipment. In addition, spent fuel is<br />

not in a form suitable for easily dispersing radioactive material, and thus, is not an<br />

attractive target for this threat because only intact spent fuel rods are considered to be<br />

an acceptable form for extended storage.

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