Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

4.116
The physical protection requirements for storage of encapsulated solidified HLW in
water basins are expected to be the same as those for storage of spent fuel. If the waste
were stored at a reprocessing plant, the facility would be a vital area and its physical
protection is described in Section 4.10.2.1. If the waste were stored at a separate water
basin facility, the safeguards evaluation for spent fuel storage, described in
Section 4.10.1.2, apply. The risk associated with the possible sabotage of solidified HLW
in water basin storage is probably less than for spent fuel.
If HLW is stored in a sealed-cask storage facility, the facility would be protected
against unauthorized entry, forced intrusion, and sabotage. In such a facility the waste
canisters are not readily accessible because:
* Remote operation is required to handle canisters.
* Massive biological shielding is required to attenuate canister radiation.
* Facility design features that protect against severe natural occurrences minimize
accessibility of the unloading/handling areas.(a)
The consequences to the public even if a sabotage effort should succeed are, however,
expected to be very small. If a canister of waste is ruptured by explosives, the dispersed
radioactive material should be confined largely to the storage area because the material is
in a solid form and not dispersable except to the extent that pulverization occurs from the
explosion energy. Safety analyses of an accidental rupture ofea HLW canister inside the
building showed that the release of radioactive material would be slight and the public
exposure negligible (See DOE/ET-0028, p. 5.4.17).
Packaged TRU wastes are not attractive targets for theft or sabotage because of the low
quantities of plutonium and the variable amounts of fission products present. The wastes
contain radioactive materials in concentrations several orders of magnitude below those in
spent fuel. Much of it would be packaged in 55-gal drums or large boxes. The variations
in fission product content will result in surface dose rates that are expected to vary from
below 0.2 R/hr to above 10 R/hr.
A sabotage threat will create concerns over radioactive releases. While sabotage may
potentially result in some releases to the atmosphere, the amounts released would result in
no significant health threats to the public. If a sabotage act causes a bitumen fire, about
10 grams of the fixed waste may be released to the cell, vault or burial crypt atmosphere;
lesser amounts would be released to the environment. While an attempted sabotage of TRU
waste storage that results in a fire could be a serious incident, the consequences-to the
public would be small.
The overall physical security required at sites containing TRU wastes protects the
public from willful misuse of this waste.
A krypton storage facility will probably be located adjacent to the reprocessing plant.
Physical protection of transportation and the storage facility to deter and prevent
(a) Only conceptual plans for such a facility have been prepared. The actual design will
involve detailed safety and safeguards analyses.