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Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste - U.S. ...

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-12- -13-<br />

Reasonable bounds for these rates can be formulated with data now in We hope these comments will be helpful to you In the preparation <strong>of</strong> a<br />

hand from the geologic record, but a research effort to do so should final statement.<br />

be put in place. Sincerel<br />

The discussion in the EIS uses the probabilities for faulting and<br />

fracturing interchangeably, but they will not necessarily be the same.<br />

Clairborne and Gera (1974) treated the problem <strong>of</strong> major fault development S cial A"Stltat to<br />

across the repository. Fracturing could be induced by distant seismic<br />

events or by the presence <strong>of</strong> the repository itself. Whether fractures -slst r SECRETARY<br />

can remain open in salt long enough for transport to take place remains<br />

an open question that needs emphasis in the EIS. Attachment<br />

Values for southeast New Mexico should not be used in a generic statement.<br />

Certainly, faulting rates <strong>of</strong> 102/yr, typical <strong>of</strong> the San Andreas system,<br />

could be avoided. A reasonable, "conservative" upper bound for this<br />

analysis might be lO- 4 /yr. The discussion on page 3.1.156 would then<br />

conclude that the risk from repository breach by faulting and flooding<br />

would be no greater than the risk from lightning, assuming the rest <strong>of</strong><br />

the analysis is correct--not definitely seven orders <strong>of</strong> magnitude less.<br />

Another possible effect <strong>of</strong> geologic storage <strong>of</strong> radioactive wastes is<br />

the increase in underground pressure as a result <strong>of</strong> entrapment <strong>of</strong> gases<br />

(helium, radon, etc.) released through radioactive decay schemes. This<br />

increased pressure, if not properly relieved, could lead to the development<br />

or reopening <strong>of</strong> fissures that would result in the escape <strong>of</strong><br />

radioactive materials to the surface. The final statement should address<br />

this potential event.<br />

Decision grid<br />

The use <strong>of</strong> the decision grid approach may be premature and unjustified<br />

at this stage. It invites invalid, quantitative comparisons <strong>of</strong> options<br />

to be made. Even though the report warns against this, there will<br />

always be those readers who tend to seize the numbers and use them<br />

improperly. Other concerns with the decision grid approach are also<br />

expressed in the attachment.<br />

Other options<br />

Other options such as seabed disposal and deep-well disposal also have<br />

to be considered promising for the future and should be pursued simultaneously<br />

with conventional geologic disposal. If properly pursued, one<br />

<strong>of</strong> the other options may eventually prove to be superior to conventional<br />

mined repositories, in which case it should be adopted. This need for<br />

continued pursuit <strong>of</strong> other technologies should be more heavily stressed<br />

in the final statement.

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