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Draft p. 1.23<br />

Issue<br />

199<br />

SAFEGUARDS<br />

One commenter suggested that the paragraph on Safeguards is misplaced and should be<br />

highlighted as a conclusion. (124)<br />

Response<br />

DOE agrees that the paragraph is out <strong>of</strong> place. The structure <strong>of</strong> the final Statement<br />

has been organized to reflect this.<br />

Draft p. 1.23<br />

Issue<br />

One commenter suggested that the statement that regulations which are in place to pro-<br />

tect against theft and sabotage will also be in place for waste disposal is not a reassuring<br />

one. There is no mention <strong>of</strong> the fact that in some respects it is dangerous to attempt to<br />

divert or sabatoge nuclear wastes. (40, 128)<br />

Response<br />

The final Statement does address the hazard to would be thieves or sabatours from radi-<br />

ation (see Sections 4.10.1.2 and 5.7).<br />

Draft p. 1.23<br />

Issue<br />

One commenter noted that the statement regarding in place regulations which are to pro-<br />

tect against theft and sabotage has not been proven to be true. Witness the theft <strong>of</strong><br />

245 Ibs <strong>of</strong> uranium from a "Navy nuclear plant." (142)<br />

Response<br />

Safeguards and physical protection measures now in effect are specifically intended to<br />

protect the public from theft <strong>of</strong> nuclear material. The material in question at a navy nuc-<br />

lear plant cannot be accounted for. Theft is one <strong>of</strong> the possibilities and must remain so<br />

but it was also concluded that this much material did not leave the plant clandestinely.<br />

Another explanation <strong>of</strong> the missing fissile material was that it is a result <strong>of</strong> imprecise<br />

material acconting practices. It is a significant challenge to account for material where<br />

large quantities are processed in scrap recovery or waste handling procedures. The scrap<br />

and waste may be degraded process material in many different forms such as degraded solids<br />

or liquids or material impacted onto filters, or inside <strong>of</strong> pipes or inside equipment.

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