Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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MARIA JOÃO CABRITA
– the intervention of democratic societies on non-democratic societies has
not always been motivated by reasonable interests, such as their security;
and has sometimes been invoked to mask purely economic interests. Th ese
cases show that some supposedly democratic societies move away from the
Rawlsian ideal of a reasonably just constitutional democracy. But this does
not invalidate the expectation of a future approximation to this ideal – the
Rawlsian realist utopia emanates, in part, from this hope.
Th e Rawlsian idea of liberal democratic peace increases under the
infl ux of two fundamental notions: the idea that, despite life’s constant
misery and fatalism, there are political and social institutions that can be
changed by people in order to make them happier and more satisfi ed; and
Montesquieu’s idea of moeurs douces, according to which the virtues promoted
by the market on citizens (attendance, diligence, punctuality and
integrity) lead to peace. Th e rational interests that drive rational people -
guided in line with fair equality and respect for all people - make democratic
peace possible. It is a state of peace by satisfaction, as described by
Raymond Aron, in the Paix et guerre entre les nations (1962).
From the perspective of this sociological study, peace - which is understood
to be the reasonable aim of all societies - is by principle either the
powerful or impotent. Regarding the principle of power three paradigms
emanate: empire - when a political unit dominates the others and withdraws
their autonomy; hegemony - when a political unit is superior to the
others but respects their autonomy; and the modus vivendi - when there
exists a balance of powers between the various political units. In turn, the
principle of impotence, due to the increasing development of technologies
of production and destruction, is the source of peace by terror - prevailing
among political units with the capacity to deliver lethal blows to each other.
But, conceptually, between peace by power and peace by impotence there is
an alternative: “peace by satisfaction” (Aron, 1962: 231s).
Th is alternative is inspired by Paul Valery’s words in Regards sur le
Monde Actuel (1931) which, succinctly, refl ect the conviction that genuine
peace can only be found in a world where all countries are satisfi ed with
their situation [3] . And it lists as abstract conditions: 1) the duty of political
units to abdicate from expansionist temptation; and 2) the security and
stability of peace by satisfaction supposes the existence of generalized trust.
In Aron’s perspective, the end of the climate of suspicion prevailing in the
3 “Il n’y aurait de paix véritable que si tout le monde était satisfait. C’est dire qu’il n’y a pas souvent
de paix véritable. Il n’y a que des paix réelles, qui ne sont comme les guerres que des expédients.”,
Valéry, 1931: 17.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 100 05-01-2012 09:38:23