Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

56
CÉDRIC RIO
ence: individuals cannot prefer a satisfaction only because of its temporal
position. As a consequence, individuals extracted from the social reality
are supposed to take into account interests of their whole existence (Rawls,
1999: 369). And because individuals in original contract are not supposed
to prefer any specifi c part of their life, principles of justice should not accord
any moral importance to temporal position. Temporal neutrality at a social
level is justifi ed by temporal neutrality at an individual scale: “Since the persons
in the original position take up the standpoint of each period, being
subject to the veil of ignorance, this symmetry is clear to them and they will
not consent to a principle that weighs nearer periods more or less heavily”
(Ibid, 260).
As Rawls, most philosophers assume temporal neutrality in their
refl ections about Intergenerational justice. Th ey think that a positive social
discount rate, and especially to favour generations solely because of their
position in time, is ethically indefensible and unjust for future generations.
From our present point of view, we have the duty to preserve natural
resources in order to allow members of future generations to benefi t from
suffi cient conditions of living. Such a representation of Intergenerational
justice assumes then members of current generations should take into
account interests and needs of future generations as well as their own interests
and needs as members of current generations.
A social time preference to guarantee liberty for all
Intuitively, if we accept the idea that individuals who do not exist yet have
some rights, it is quite diffi cult today to deny the fact that all individuals
have the same right to equal liberty. [7] But individuals need suffi cient social
conditions of life to have a real liberty and to edify long-term projects. And
these social conditions of life should be edifi ed beforehand in time to be
sure that all individuals will benefi t from real liberty.
Rawls could be right to assume that individuals extracted from social
reality cannot have any time preference. But in fact, arguments against
pure time preference developed to discredit positive social discount rate
have created an artifi cial separation between the objective and subjective
7 Derek Parfi t underlined Non-existence problem to discuss about the legitimacy to give some
rights to individuals who not exist yet as members of future generation. As the same, Nonidentity
problem consists in the fact that identity of future individuals depend from choices of
previous generations (Parfi t, 1984). We will presuppose here that individual who not exist yet
have equal right than those who exist today.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 56 05-01-2012 09:38:21