Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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CLAUDIA REITINGER
properties, like having a certain colour, size, preferences or rights can be
predicated only of some subject that already exists. Th ey conclude further,
because it is central for every theory of justice to ascribe rights to persons
that the interests of future people cannot be protected within a theory of
intergenerational justice (apud Beckerman/Pasek, 2001: 15-20).
Th e objection of Beckerman/Pasek rests on the arbitrary assumption
that presently existing rights alone can ground duties. However, this
assumption is doubtful. Why should our duties not be based on the future
rights of our descendants? A simple example can illustrate this point. Suppose
that I hide a time bomb somewhere in a city. Th is bomb will explode a
hundred years from now. All people, who will be injured, are not alive yet.
Nevertheless is seems not problematic to claim, that my action violates the
rights of the injured people and that my action therefore is morally wrong.
All we have to assume for that example is that there will be people living in
the future and that these will be the bearers of rights. Th e time gap between
my action and the injury of future people does not alter the fact that my
action violates their rights. To hold that view we neither have to assume that
the right exists detached from the bearer nor that the right violation occurs
before the existence of the right. We only have to accept that an action in
the present causes the violation of a future right and therefore is wrong
(apud, Elliot, 1989: 162). And this seems unproblematic.
3. Conclusion
Th e question of how to solve the Non-Identity Problem is crucial for our
understanding of our obligation to our descendents. I argued that this
Problem can be addressed through an appeal to the rights of future people
and that this solution is superior to a redefi nition of harm. My main argument
was based on the openness of a rights based solution to diff erent principles
of justice. Th e threshold notion of harm can only be combined with
diff erent principles of justice if we broaden our notion of harm in a way
that clearly diff ers from our normal language usage. Th e appeal to future
people’s rights does not require such a deviation. Because the rights based
solution is purely formal the question, which we actually owe to future living
people has to be solved on another level of proof.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 76 05-01-2012 09:38:22