Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

BETTERNESS, SPECTRUM CASES AND THE CHALLENGE TO TRANSITIVITY IN AXIOLOGY
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Broome, 2004.) According to this, the two principles in question would be
on the same level, with none of them having priority over the other one,
insofar as one condition applies: the outcome must qualify above a certain
level with respect to both values. So suppose we can measure how outcomes
qualify with respect to these two values according to a certain scale.
Suppose also that an outcome qualifi es very poorly with respect to one of
the values. If this were so, any increase, however big, with respect to the
other value would be forbidden if it meant a decrease, however small, with
respect to this one.
Th ere is an alternative way of considering critical levels. Th is one would
focus not on the minimum level, but on the maximum one. So suppose
the outcome got a very high score for one of the values. According to this
approach, increases for the other value would have lexical priority over
increases over this one.
Finally, according to yet another position, we could say that no value
would have lexical priority over the other one provided that the diff erence
between the scores for those values an outcome gets is not signifi cant. If the
diff erence in scores were higher than that, the value according to which the
outcome ranked lower would have lexical priority.
Now, there are basically three ways in which our intuitions towards
general principles and particular comparisons of diff erent alternatives can
be assessed. Th ese are the following ones:
(i) Th e particularist response. We may give no weight to intuitions
regarding general values or principles. Th is is the position that particularists
will maintain (as a matter of fact, they may even lack any of those intuitions).
(ii) Th e total primacy of intuitions concerning principles. We may consider
that we should only follow our intuitions regarding principles, which
would be completely unassailable by any intuition regarding outcomes.
(iii) Balancing our intuitions toward outcomes and principles. We may
think that our intuitions regarding outcomes and principles must all be
taken into account, and that we need to combine them in some way. Th is
would be, for instance, the position that those who follow the method of
refl ective equilibrium would assume. Among those who accept it, some
may pay special attention to intuitions towards outcomes, others may not
have a particular inclination for either outcomes or general principles, and
others may consider that our intuitions towards principles are close to having
absolute priority, though they may be questioned if we have very strong
intuitions concerning particular cases.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 131 05-01-2012 09:38:25