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Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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66<br />

CLAUDIA REITINGER<br />

Depletion: As a community, we must choose whether to deplete or conserve<br />

certain kinds of resources. If we choose depletion, the quality of life<br />

over the next two centuries will be slightly higher than it would have been if<br />

we had chosen conservation. But it would later, for many centuries, be much<br />

lower than it would have been if we had chosen conservation. Th is would be<br />

because, at the start of the period, people would have to fi nd alternatives for the<br />

resources that we had depleted (Parfi t, 1984: 362).<br />

Should we choose depletion or conservations of resources? If we think<br />

that we should choose conservation how can we justify this choice? Intuitively<br />

we could object to the depletion of resources because we tend to<br />

compare our minimal loss in case of saving with the much greater gain of<br />

future people. Th e principle behind such a justifi cation is clearly utilitarian.<br />

We compare the overall well being in case of depletion with the overall well<br />

being in case of conservation. Th e overall well being in case of conservation<br />

is much higher. So we have to choose conservation. Although utilitarianism<br />

can give us a plausible answer in this example the application of an<br />

aggregation principle leads to severe problems when applied to questions of<br />

population policies. It obliges us to choose the population policy in which<br />

the sum of well being is maximum. Th is maximum can be reached through<br />

greatly increasing the number of people even if the life of those people is<br />

barely worth living. Parfi t calls this the repugnant conclusion and therefore<br />

rejects the impersonal total principle (apud Parfi t,1984: 388). If we agree<br />

with Parfi t that it is implausible to compensate the loss of well being of people<br />

with a higher number of people we cannot stick to our initial justifi cation<br />

for choosing the conservation policy.<br />

Can we put forward other reasons for choosing conservation? As in the<br />

railway example major changes in the policy of resources have an infl uence<br />

on the identity of future people in the long run. If we choose conservation,<br />

power stations will be shut <strong>do</strong>wn in many places. Some cities will die out,<br />

new cities will be founded. Th e energy price will increase. People might<br />

change their means of transport. Diff erent people will marry or even in the<br />

same marriages, children would be conceived at diff erent times. Because it<br />

is plausible to assume, that aft er some generations diff erent people would<br />

live depending on the policy we a<strong>do</strong>pt, it is not possible to reject the depletion<br />

of resources on the grounds that these future people would have a<br />

lower quality of life. Future people cannot reasonably complain about our<br />

choice. As a consequence the people who live under the resource depletion<br />

policy must para<strong>do</strong>xically state: ‘Of course our life is not particularly good.<br />

<strong>Diacritica</strong> <strong>25</strong>-2_<strong>Filosofia</strong>.<strong>indb</strong> 66 05-01-2012 09:38:21

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