Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
66<br />
CLAUDIA REITINGER<br />
Depletion: As a community, we must choose whether to deplete or conserve<br />
certain kinds of resources. If we choose depletion, the quality of life<br />
over the next two centuries will be slightly higher than it would have been if<br />
we had chosen conservation. But it would later, for many centuries, be much<br />
lower than it would have been if we had chosen conservation. Th is would be<br />
because, at the start of the period, people would have to fi nd alternatives for the<br />
resources that we had depleted (Parfi t, 1984: 362).<br />
Should we choose depletion or conservations of resources? If we think<br />
that we should choose conservation how can we justify this choice? Intuitively<br />
we could object to the depletion of resources because we tend to<br />
compare our minimal loss in case of saving with the much greater gain of<br />
future people. Th e principle behind such a justifi cation is clearly utilitarian.<br />
We compare the overall well being in case of depletion with the overall well<br />
being in case of conservation. Th e overall well being in case of conservation<br />
is much higher. So we have to choose conservation. Although utilitarianism<br />
can give us a plausible answer in this example the application of an<br />
aggregation principle leads to severe problems when applied to questions of<br />
population policies. It obliges us to choose the population policy in which<br />
the sum of well being is maximum. Th is maximum can be reached through<br />
greatly increasing the number of people even if the life of those people is<br />
barely worth living. Parfi t calls this the repugnant conclusion and therefore<br />
rejects the impersonal total principle (apud Parfi t,1984: 388). If we agree<br />
with Parfi t that it is implausible to compensate the loss of well being of people<br />
with a higher number of people we cannot stick to our initial justifi cation<br />
for choosing the conservation policy.<br />
Can we put forward other reasons for choosing conservation? As in the<br />
railway example major changes in the policy of resources have an infl uence<br />
on the identity of future people in the long run. If we choose conservation,<br />
power stations will be shut <strong>do</strong>wn in many places. Some cities will die out,<br />
new cities will be founded. Th e energy price will increase. People might<br />
change their means of transport. Diff erent people will marry or even in the<br />
same marriages, children would be conceived at diff erent times. Because it<br />
is plausible to assume, that aft er some generations diff erent people would<br />
live depending on the policy we a<strong>do</strong>pt, it is not possible to reject the depletion<br />
of resources on the grounds that these future people would have a<br />
lower quality of life. Future people cannot reasonably complain about our<br />
choice. As a consequence the people who live under the resource depletion<br />
policy must para<strong>do</strong>xically state: ‘Of course our life is not particularly good.<br />
<strong>Diacritica</strong> <strong>25</strong>-2_<strong>Filosofia</strong>.<strong>indb</strong> 66 05-01-2012 09:38:21