Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
objection. First, it does not follow from (1’) that it is wrong to conceive
children if one of their rights will be violated through an action that is performed
by another person. (1’) only states that an action is morally wrong if
the action is a necessary condition for the existence of the child and at the
same time leads to the result that the rights of the child cannot be fulfi lled.
Th e objection against the decision of the 14-year old girl is that the mother
cannot attend her parental duties towards the child. For the assessment of
this example it is irrelevant if someone lies to the child or breaks a promise
given to the child in the future. Second, if we are in a situation in which is
not possible not to violate the rights of people we cannot be obliged not to
violate a right. To demand the impossible would violate the principle ‘ought
implies can’.
Th e second objection raised by Parfi t is that once future people would
realize that their existence cannot be separated from their rights` violation,
these people would nevertheless be glad to be alive and therefore would
waive their rights (apud Parfi t, 1984: 365). To emphasise this point, Parfi t
refers to a letter of a middle-aged man written to Th e Times who was born
by a 14-year girl and denied that the action of his mother was wrong. He
waived his rights. Parfi t concludes that this undermines the right-based
objection to his mother’s action. Th e same would be true for the people
living under the depletion policy. Although it might be the case that future
people would waive their rights this is not a reason for giving up the view
that actions, which cause the existence of future people are morally wrong.
If we are confronting people with the dilemma either not to be alive or to
waive their rights we can expect that these people would choose to waive
their rights if their life is worth living (apud Parfit, 1984: 364). T h e
point is, that the people under the depletion policy have no choice except
to waive their rights. Th ey fi nd themselves in a situation of constraint.
Th rough an involuntary waiving of their rights it cannot be concluded that
the action is morally right. Th e situation of future people is similar to that
of a kidnap victim which faces the choice either to have her little fi nger cut
off or to be shot dead. If the kidnap victim chooses to sacrifi ce her fi nger
and waive her right to physical integrity we would nevertheless claim that
the kidnapper has acted morally wrong because the waiving of the right was
not a voluntary decision.
Th e third objection is that the reference to the rights of future people is
mistaken because future people cannot be said to have any rights now. Th is
objection was put forward by Beckerman/Pasek (2001). Th ey argue that we
make a categorical mistake by ascribing rights to non-living entities. All
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