Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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1. Intransitive preferences
OSCAR HORTA
At fi rst sight, most of us would assume that the “_ is better than _” relation
is transitive. [1] However, theorists such as Larry Temkin (1987; 1996;
1997; forthcoming) and Stuart Rachels (1998; 2001) have argued that this
need not be so. [2] Th ey have presented challenging examples that seriously
question the idea that we need to accept transitivity in axiology. [3] Th eir
argument rests on the fact that we sometimes have intransitive sets of preferences
(or at least many of us do). Th is may not happen oft en in everyday
life. [4] But it does happen when we are confronted with cases in which
two diff erent values (or dimensions of one value) confl ict. Most of us have
intuitions (actually, clear intuitions) regarding these cases that are visibly
intransitive.
From this, Rachels and Temkin have concluded that we should give
up the idea that outcomes can be ordered according to transitive sets with
regards to how good they are. Th is is something that strikes most of us as
clearly counterintuitive. Some of us may think that the transitivity of “_ is
better than _” is part of the defi nition of “better”. Others may think that
this is not so, but claim that whatever intuitions we may have regarding
which outcomes are better, they cannot outweigh the strong intuition that
the mentioned relations need to be transitive.
Some may think this is not a very relevant issue, and that this is just a
theoretical problem. However, this is far from being so. First, it is something
that can be particularly relevant when it comes to designing general
policies. Second, it poses a formidable problem for value theory as such.
1 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper I will focus on what is better, rather than on preferences.
At some points, I may say that we prefer one outcome to another one, but I will usually say that
we have certain intuitions concerning which outcomes are better. Th is may imply the assumption
of a realist position regarding personal value. However, the claims made in this paper may
also be accepted by those who disagree with this view.
2 On this see also, among others, Norcross (1999); Aldred (2002); Chan (2003); Qizilbash (2005);
Dorsey (2009).
3 Th ese problems, which aff ect the very core of practical reason, are addressed in much detail in
Temkin (forthcoming).
4 Th ere are, though, some cases in which we do have intransitive sets of preferences. Moreover, in
some cases we would say it is not particularly odd to have such sets of preferences. We may, for
instance, prefer to buy a new cheap computer rather than going on working with our old one.
But we may also prefer to buy a not so cheap but better computer rather than the cheap one. And
then, we may think that the more expensive computer is not worth its money, insofar as our old
one still works. It would defi nitely be better for someone with this set of preferences to get rid of
at least one of them. Yet we would not say that she would be crazy or obtuse for having them.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 126 05-01-2012 09:38:25