Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
According to the notion of harm (II) and (III) in Non-Identity cases
no harm can be done. Th e diachronic notion (II) of harm presupposes the
existence of the harmed person at time t 1 because we have to compare the
well being of that person at t 1 with the level of well being at t 2 . Th is condition
is not fulfi lled in Non-Identity cases. At t 1 the person is not alive.
According to the subjunctive notion of harm (III) a person must be worse
off due to our action (inaction) at t 2 compared with her level of well being
at t 2 in case of our inaction (action). Because our action (inaction) is a necessary
condition for the existence of that person we cannot compare their
diff erent levels of well being at t 2 .
Unlike in (II) and (III) the threshold notion of harm is independent of
the identity of future people. Any act that causes people to fall below a specifi
ed threshold harms a person and therefore is wrong. Th us, the threshold
notion of harm can explain in Non-Identity cases – in same and diff erent
number choices – why an action is wrong.
Consider once again Parfi t’s Depletion example. Th e threshold notion
of harm can give us an explanation as to why we think that the depletion
of resources is wrong. If the depletion of resources causes the quality of life
of future people to fall below a specifi ed threshold our action harms this
people. Th e same is true for the child of the 14-year old girl. If the 14-year
old mother is not able to ensure her child a decent minimum it is wrong to
conceive a child that early.
Th ere are diff erent objections to the threshold notion of harm. First
it can be stated, that the threshold notion of harm is both, too wide and too
narrow. Too wide, because according to the threshold conception, in some
cases it follows harm is done where clearly no harm is done. Too narrow,
because the threshold conception is not able to cover all cases of which we
normally state that a person is harmed (apud Meyer, 2005, 52-53).
Consider the following example:
Suppose a doctor has two courses of action: either to let a patient die or to
intervene and improve his condition without bringing him above the threshold
because the treatment requires a deforming medical intervention (Meyer,
2005: 52). [2]
Because it is not plausible to claim that the doctor acts morally wrong in
treating the patient the threshold conception is too wide. Meyer gives two
2 My translation
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