Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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CÉDRIC RIO
Debates about Intergenerational justice, that is to say fair allocation of social
and natural resources in time, consist in determining which kind of obligations
members of one generation have towards members of other generations.
Intergenerational justice includes refl ections about topics as pension
scheme, or sustainable development. We will focus here our discussions on
sustainable development, that is to say “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development,
1987). Intergenerational justice involves complex issues, especially
when we have to deal with individuals who are not living at the same time.
Its complexity results mainly from the temporal dimension: because of the
irreversible direction of the time, allocation of resources must be thought
from present to future, from current generations towards next generations.
Th e level of transmission or sacrifi ces required to individuals in favour
of their successors in time can be illustrated by a saving rate: the higher
the saving rate is required the more individuals have to sacrifi ce their own
satisfaction to guarantee next generations’ well-being. A specifi c discussion
opposes economists, in a Utilitarian perspective, and Liberal egalitarian
philosophers about the legitimacy to accord more social value to members
of current generations than to members of future generations. A large
majority of utilitarians assume as legitimate to accord, at a social level, more
value to current benefi ts or pains than to future one. Th ey assume then a
social discount rate that is to say to discount future pains and benefi ts: from
a present perspective, the further in time the less the profi ts and pains are
valued. Liberal egalitarian philosophers denounce such a proposal because
it sounds unjust for the members of future generations. It is immoral to
accord a social preference to individuals according solely to their position
in time. Th ey claim at the opposite for temporal neutrality.
According to the Liberal egalitarianism perspective, a good social policy
consists in guaranteeing to all individuals an equal liberty. In an intergenerational
context, such a principle concerns people from current and
future generations. But does such impartiality guarantee equal liberty for
all individuals whatever their position in time? According to us, the Liberal
egalitarianism principle of justice can be attained only if we assume a
social time preference. We have to act in priority for social justice between
individuals from current generations: members of future generations will
benefi t from real liberty only if we act in the present by reducing the impact
of the social origin and social inequalities. A social time preference will
then benefi t to members of current and future generations.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 52 05-01-2012 09:38:20