Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

20
BERIL SÖZMEN IDEMEN
doubt whether the child is theirs or not (Richards 1986: 208). Although
one could argue that semen is infl ationary and neither its production nor
its delivery is any physical burden to speak of, the argument above applies
in the same way to men. Sperm is part of a man’s body and is necessary for
conception. Disregarding this fact is making use of a man’s body for purposes
that he does not consent to.
Men and women should then both have to consent to the use of their
bodies for conception insofar as both supply a gamete, independently of
whether conception takes place in or outside a body. Th ey are distinctly different
however when it comes to the pregnancy. In the case of the woman
the further use of her body is needed for the zygote to develop into a viable
foetus and it has been persuasively argued that this also requires the consent
of the woman. Yet there is a third ground for consent that is separate
from the bodily investment. Consent is also necessary when it comes to the
question of whether an individual wants to become a parent or not. In the
case of the mother, this is not the consent needed for the pregnancy but the
consent needed to become the mother of a child, independently of whether
the child is then given for adoption and plays no further part in her life.
To argue that the question of abortion is concerned solely with the forced
pregnancy is to disregard both the emotional distress that can be caused by
involuntarily becoming a parent and the loss of autonomy in not being able
to choose parenthood for oneself.
If this is the case then there is little reason why the same need for consent
shouldn’t apply to the father. Th e position paraphrased above argues
that there is a fundamental diff erence between the parenthood of men and
women due to the fact that it’s the woman who has to carry the child. It may
also be argued that there is a fundamentally ‘feminine’ bond between the
mother and the child that makes it a far more diffi cult matter for a woman
to give up her child than for a man. It is an empirical question whether this
is the case but the reappearance of the popular fi gure of the callous man
incapable of forming caring relationships and of motherly, self-denying
women in this context is enough to make us wary. Even if there were such
diff erences they would be diff erences in average. But diff erences in average
should not be taken to ground moral decisions in individual cases (Richards
1986) and therefore it would be sheer female chauvinism to argue that
the consent to be given by the woman to become a mother – even if she is
never to see the child again aft er delivery – is fundamentally diff erent and
morally more relevant than the consent to be given by the man to become
a father.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 20 05-01-2012 09:38:18