Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
can claim that their rights have been violated through an action even if this
action is a necessary condition for their existence (apud Woodward, 1986:
818). His argument is analogy: an airline refuses to let a black person buy a
ticket for a fl ight on racist grounds. If the airline crashes, the person is better
off through the refusal of the airline to sell him a ticket. Nevertheless the
airline had wronged the person because racial discrimination violates his
rights (apud Woodward, 1986: 810-11).
Th e idea is to replace (1) An action or a social policy can be morally
wrong only if it harms a person through (1’) An action or social policy
can be morally wrong (only) if it violates the rights of future people. On
that reading, an action can wrong a person even in the case where no harm
has been done. To violate the rights of future people means that an action
causes that the future rights or future people are not fulfi lled. [4] Th e action
must be both a necessary condition for the existence of these people and a
necessary condition for the violation of a right.
Let’s consider once again the examples given by Parfi t to test this solution.
How could one argue against the decision of the 14-year old girl to
become pregnant? Woodward argues that her decision can be rejected on
the ground of specifi c duties that parents owe to their children. Th at is,
to have duties to provide their children food, shelter, education, love and
aff ection, and duties not to abuse their child physically or emotionally. If
the 14-year old girl is not able to fulfi l these parental duties we can reject
her decision on the basis of the rights of her future child (apud Woodward,
1986: 815). Th e point that the child would be nevertheless glad to be alive
although not all of its rights are fulfi lled does not alter the fact, that the
mother wronged the child. Again we can draw a parallel to the airline example.
Th e fact that the person was not able to take the fl ight and therefore is
still alive does not change our view that the airline violated the rights of the
man through racial discrimination.
What about the depletion example? Th e judgment of this example
depends on two things. First, on the level of well- being future people will
enjoy under the depletion policy. Second on the principles of distributive
justice we can reasonably defend in the intergenerational realm. In Parft ’s
example we only know that under the depletion policy the level of well
being of future people will be much lower than it would have been if we
4 For this view it is not necessary to hold that the rights of future people already exist. Th e duties
owed to future people are grounded on their future rights. Th e only necessary assumption for
this argument is that there will be future people at all and that these people will be bearer of
rights in the future. For a further discussion on that issue see Robert Elliot, 1989.
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