Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
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THE RAWLSIAN IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS PEACE BY SATISFACTION<br />
101<br />
international context of the 60’s, required the implementation of international<br />
law; that is, the enlargement of the type of peace which is in place in<br />
Western Europe, peace by satisfaction.<br />
Rawls adapts this concept, removing it from the contemporary constitutionalist<br />
realist discourse about the relations between states (see Doyle,<br />
1977: 151s) and substituting this for the realistic utopia of the relationship<br />
between peoples. His aim is to refute the vision based on historical accounts<br />
and contingent interpretations, which evaluates the relationship between<br />
states as the continuity of the state of war - the complex realism of Th ucydides<br />
[4] . If peace among democratic peoples arises from the fact that they are<br />
satisfi ed with the status quo for the right reasons, of their status as “satisfi ed<br />
peoples”, then we can understand it as peace by satisfaction. Insofar as this<br />
translates a situation which is made more stable the more it is generalized,<br />
it is suitable to the guiding principle of liberal foreign policy, namely: “[to]<br />
gradually to shape all not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction, until<br />
eventually (in the ideal case) all societies are liberal” (Rawls, 1999: 60).<br />
Th e ideal theory of the Law of Peoples probes the possibility of a “peace<br />
zone” extending to peoples whose political culture is distinct from the<br />
democratic culture, since it conceives a reasonable society of peoples that<br />
includes decent hierarchical peoples - associationist societies, which treat<br />
their affi liates as members of associations and not as free and equal citizens.<br />
Th e Rawlsian description of “decent people” is situated in the hypothetical<br />
<strong>do</strong>main, just as his description of a “liberal people”. Rawls wants to show,<br />
on the one hand, the viability of a regime that, while not democratic, allows<br />
for political discussion and is receptive to the structural reforms; and, on<br />
the another hand, that “the liberal conception requires not only, from other<br />
societies what they can reasonably guarantee, without the mastering or<br />
degrading them “(Cabrita, 2009: 237).<br />
In assessing the criterion of decent hierarchical societies, Rawls begins<br />
by pointing out that this type of society is non-aggressive - unlike the outlaw<br />
states - and resorts to peaceful means, such as diplomacy and trade,<br />
to achieve its legitimate purposes (see Rawls, 1999: 64). Th is means that<br />
the normative horizon of decency, according to its common good idea of<br />
4 Th e interpretative insights of complex realism are based on the following assumptions: “First,<br />
the international scene is properly described as an anarchy - a multiplicity of powers without<br />
a government. Second, the primary actors are independent states whose <strong>do</strong>mestic hierarchy<br />
(sovereignty) complements international anarchy. Th ird, the lack of a legitimate international<br />
source of controlling authority means no restraint - whether moral, social, cultural, economic,<br />
or political - is suffi ciently strong or general either to eliminate completely or to manage reliably<br />
confl icts of interest, prestige, or value”, in Doyle, 1997: 45.<br />
<strong>Diacritica</strong> <strong>25</strong>-2_<strong>Filosofia</strong>.<strong>indb</strong> 101 05-01-2012 09:38:23