Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
Th e disjunctive notion of harm can meet the second objection. In cases
where we worsen the situation of a person through an action without bringing
him below a certain threshold the disjunctive notion can nevertheless
explain why the person is harmed. In Non-Identity cases according to the
disjunctive notion of harm, people are harmed if they fall below a specifi ed
threshold.
2.2. An argument against the threshold notion of harm
Although Meyer’s proposal gives a sound solution for the Non-Identity
Problems I want to give an argument as to why the threshold notion of
harm is not entirely satisfying. Th e argument rests on the question of how
to specify the threshold in order to catch up to our normal language use
of harming a person. Th e diffi culty of solving the Non-Identity Problem
through a threshold notion of harm becomes obvious when we think about
the justice principles, which are combinable with this solution. Meyer
(2005) argues that the threshold can be specifi ed in diff erent ways. One
option is to understand the threshold as an absolute suffi citarian standard
and hold that people living today are obliged to leave enough for future
people to live a live above a certain level of well being (apud Meyer, 2005:
39). For suffi citarians equality above the threshold does not matter. If our
actions cause future people to realize a lower level of well being than we
enjoy, suffi citarians have no reason to reject such a choice as long as their
level of well being is above the threshold. Another possibility for specifying
the threshold is through egalitarian considerations. We could believe
that it is unfair to cause future people to enjoy a much lower level of well
being than we enjoy ourselves, with a lower level of resources, capabilities,
or whatever metric we might consider as defendable.
Th ere is a problem of leaving the specifi cation of the threshold open for
diff erent principles of justice because the notion of harm is not appropriate
for all these principles. Consider a modifi ed version of Parfi t’s depletion
example. Let’s suppose that the depletion of resources causes the average
level of well being of future people to be 20 percent lower than the level of
well being we enjoy ourselves. Although the future people have a lower level
of well being they enjoy a really good life. Th eir disadvantage lies in the fact
that they have to economise their energy consumption due to our resource’s
policies and have to spend a huge amount of the remaining resources for
the investigation of alternative energy supplies. Nevertheless they enjoy
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