Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

22
BERIL SÖZMEN IDEMEN
Th omson’s discussion of abortion turns to what Hursthouse calls “protovirtue
theory” (Hursthouse 1997: 227). Th e real question about abortion is
not, Th omson argues, whether or not the foetus is a person or whether or
not it has a right to the use of its mother’s body. Th e question is rather what
the morally decent thing to do would be in such a situation. Th is reformulation
takes the particularities of a specifi c case of abortion into account. It
does not give a blanket decision about whether or not abortion is morally
permissible (Th omson 1986: 55).
Regarding consent this argument serves to ‘emancipate’ both man and
woman of the ‘special responsibility’ of a prospective parent towards the
child unless assumed explicitly or implicitly (Th omson 1986: 54). Th omson
does not content herself with the mother but makes this point for both
parents: “[...] if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having
a child, they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the
child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it” (Th omson
1986: 54). Assuming responsibility in such a case would be an example
of being a Good Samaritan, i.e. a case of supererogatory moral act. Th omson
makes this point only for prospective parents who are united in their
wish against having a child. I will return to this question when discussing
cases, where the mother wishes to keep the child against the express wish of
the father and consider whether this makes a diff erence to the status of the
prospective father.
Attitudes towards procreation and abortion
Rosalind Hursthouse claims that the two most commonly discussed aspects
of abortion, i.e. the status of the foetus and women’s rights are both “fundamentally
irrelevant” (Hursthouse 1997: 227) for
[...] supposing only that women have such a moral right, nothing follows
from this supposition about the morality of abortion, according to virtue theory,
once it is noted (quite generally, not with particular reference to abortion)
that in exercising a moral right I can do something cruel, or callous, or selfi sh,
fl y over to a terminally ill Th omson whose only chance of survival is the touch of his hand on
her brow. He would not, however, be morally obligated to do so or conversely, Th omson would
have no right that he does so (comp. Th omson 1986, 45). Th us, the right to life should not be
understood as the right to expect something of others. In other words the traditionally postulated
link between rights and obligations is severed.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 22 05-01-2012 09:38:18