Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

104
MARIA JOÃO CABRITA
Rawls seeks to defend himself of this suspicion by reiterating that his
liberal vision of foreign policy asserts the preservation of the self-determination
of peoples as a good, the fact of reasonable pluralism of the international
community and that, consequently, it is not ethnocentric. Th e mere
fact of recognizing the representatives of a decent hierarchical people, an
idealized Islamic people called “Kazanistan”, as part of the international
agreement at the origin of the well-ordered Society of Peoples opens the
way to a political conception of peace which is more inclusive than the idea
of peace that emanates from the simple proof of democratic peacefulness.
Once such peoples exist and once their cooperation with democratic liberal
peoples is implements, they embody the group of satisfi ed peoples, which
satisfy their fundamental interests in coordination with the fundamental
interests of all other peoples, under the auspices of the Law of Peoples and
the criterion of reciprocity embedded in it.
At the level of non-ideal theory, of explanation of the necessary means
to the progressive realization of the ideal of a reasonable well-ordered society
of peoples, Rawls clarifi es the meaning of just peace and humanitarian
assistance. He begins, in the pathway of Michael Walzer (1977) and of the
principles contained in “Fift y Years aft er Hiroshima (1995), by developing
a doctrine of just war in order to explain how the Society of Peoples
must deal with states that are tendentiously expansionistic and refuse to
honor the Law of Peoples and so disrespect human rights, which he calls
the outlaw states. Th en, he refers the duty of the Society of Peoples to assist
societies which are burdened by unfavorable conditions (burdened societies)
- which as a result of historical, cultural, social, political and economic
circumstances, fail to establish reasonably just (or at least decent) institutions.
Th e well-ordered peoples do not wage war against each other and when
they embark on a just war - in defense of themselves or their allies - are
intent on just and lasting peace among peoples, especially with their enemy
(see Rawls: 1999: 94). Consequently, they must conduct it in an open and
public form, a way that off sets the fear of retaliation and vengeance from
the imagination of the aggressor. In a just war well-ordered peoples should
target only those responsible for the confl ict (leaders and offi cials of state) [8] ,
respect the human rights of their enemies and, if possible, teach them the
content of these rights. Th at is, they must set examples for their practice in
8 Only in supreme emergency case the just war is targeting the civilian members of society - see
Walzer, 1977: 251-268 e Rawls, 1999: 108-110. It is an exception applies where an off ensive
jeopardize the well-ordered societies.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 104 05-01-2012 09:38:24