Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

BETTERNESS, SPECTRUM CASES AND THE CHALLENGE TO TRANSITIVITY IN AXIOLOGY
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in favour of intransitivity. But it is something that would still leave other
important problems unresolved. In this paper I will focus in one of them:
the fact that the rejection of transitivity does not provide us with any solution
regarding what is the best alternative available within the spectrum.
Suppose we had to choose which one of all the pains in the spectrum we
had to undergo. Which one would we choose? Accepting that the “_ is better
than _” relation is not intransitive gives us little guidance to solve this
problem.
In fact, there are other factors involved here that are relevant for this
problem. In the next sections I will examine some of them. In section 4,
I will describe what are the diff erent ways in which we may combine our
intuitions towards particular outcomes and general principles. Next, in section
5 I will consider what are the solutions that can be given to the problem
of what is the best alternative in this spectrum according to those ways of
combining our intuitions. Section 6 will summarize them. Finally, in section
7 I will mention what consequences follow from this for the argument
for intransitivity based on spectrum cases.
4. A problem of methods: valuing outcomes and principles
Th ere are at least two kinds of intuitions we have to consider when we are
facing diff erent outcomes towards which we have confl icting preferences.
We may have intuitions concerning particular outcomes and concerning
general principles or values that appear to be relevant for them.
(i) Preferences regarding outcomes. We oft en have the intuition that a
certain outcome is better than another one. Th is happens when we examine
each of the possible pairs of options available in the spectrum. We consider
that A 1 is better than A 2 and A 3 , we consider that A 2 is better than A 3 and A 4 ,
and so on; and we also consider that A n is better than A 1 and A 2 , that A n-1 is
better than A n and A 1 , etc.
(ii) Preferences for values or principles. Just as we have intuitions that
drive us to think some particular alternatives are better than others (for
instance, the intuition that A 1 is better than A 2 , or that A n is better than
A 1 ), we also have intuitions that drive us to think that some of the principles
against which we may evaluate outcomes are right. For instance, we all
appear to accept the principle that says that, other things being equally, less
intense pain is better than more intense pain. In fact, most of us fi nd that
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 129 05-01-2012 09:38:25