Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

130
OSCAR HORTA
principle obvious. Th e same happens in the case of the principle that points
out that pain for a shorter time is better than pain for a longer time.
Th ese two principles apply in this spectrum case. So we need to have a
way in which we can combine them. Th ere are at least three diff erent methods
to do this. Th ey are the ways in which principles or values (or dimensions
of them) can be combined in general:
(ii.a) Lexical priority. We may reject continuity between these values
or principles, and maintain that one of them is lexically prior to the other
one, that is, that it always trumps over the other one. So, suppose we consider
two values such as equality and utility. According to this perspective,
if equality were the main, lexically prior, value, no matter how much a situation
could improve with regards to utility, that change would always make
things worse if it meant a reduction of equality. However, given two situations
equally good with respect to equality, a situation would be better if
it were better with respect to utility. Something similar would happen if
instead of one value we considered two dimensions of a single value. [6]
(ii.b) Combination at the same level. Another way to combine principles
is to put them, so to say, on the same level, so none of them is rendered
lexically prior to the other one. So suppose we are assuming this view and
considering two dimensions of the same value, such as quantity or quality
of utility. We thus assume that it is better if there is pain for a shorter, rather
than a longer time, and that it is better if there is a milder, rather than a
more severe pain. According to this, we would have to accept that no matter
how long a pain is, there has to be a certain degree of intensity such that it
makes another pain worse even if it is a very short one (provided that it is
long enough to be fully appreciated and that the one who experiences it can
notice the diff erence between such a pain and one that is shorter or longer).
Equally, it means that no matter how intense a pain is, there has to be a certain
duration for a pain such that it makes that pain worse even if it is very
mild (provided that it is intense enough to be fully appreciated and that the
one who experiences it can notice the diff erence between such a pain and
one a bit more or less intense).
(ii.c) Critical levels. Th ere is a third way which would combine the
two previous approaches. Th is view would consist in setting some “critical
points” which would put a limit to how each principle can outweigh
the other one. (See on this Blackorby / Bossert / Donaldson, 1997; see also
6 For a view favourable for this, see Dorsey (2009), who has been criticized by Broome (2010).
See Chang (1997) for a wider discussion of the topics involved by this problem. See also Griffi n
(1986).
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 130 05-01-2012 09:38:25