Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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OSCAR HORTA
between 1 and i such that A 1 would have a preference over A h of f, such that
f would be the maximum preference of A 1 over any other alternative:
A 1 > f-2 A h-2 ; A 1 > f-1 A h-1 ; A 1 > f A h ; A 1 > f-1 A h+1 ; A 1 > f-2 A h+2
Second, there should be another point j between i and n such that A j
would have a preference over A 1 of g, such that g would be the maximum
preference over A 1 or any other alternative:
A j-2 > g-2 A 1 ; A j-1 > g-1 A 1 ; A j > g A 1 ; A j+1 > g-1 A 1 ; A j+2 > g-2 A 1
According to this, the globally preferred option of all the spectrum
would be A j .
Does this make sense? If we think our decisions in cases such as these
must be carried out according to what general principles prescribe, this
conclusion may seem absurd to us. But if we are just considering the pondered
weight of our intuitions towards outcomes, this solution is possible.
Moreover, it seems intuitively acceptable. According to it, the best option
would be to suff er some pain more signifi cant than a mosquito bite, though
very far from the terrible torture we fi nd in A 1 (it may be something like a
somehow painful slap in the face every day). But it would last for an amount
of time considerably shorter than the mosquito bites in A n . Many would
still fi nd this worse than suff ering a mosquito bite for an extremely long
time, but still, it seems a fair alternative.
Of course, it is apparent that there is something really odd with the
claim that A j is the best option, because there are other options available
that appear to be locally better than A j , such as A j-1 , A j-2 , A j-3 . A response to
this that would be available to us if we believe that the “_ is better than _”
relation is not transitive, is that this is not really a problem, since no inferences
are allowed from betterness in one case to betterness in another one.
If we think our preferences must be transitive, this is a problem we need to
solve by rejecting the claim that such alternatives are better than A j , even if
that is a counterintuitive solution.
Some of those who defend that the “_ is better than _” relation is not
transitive may still disagree with the idea that A j as the best option. Because
they can reject any inference from what is better in one case to what can be
better in another one, they may accept any solution throughout all the spectrum.
Th e case for intransitivity is based in the idea that there is no reason
to sacrifi ce any of our immediate intuitions regarding what outcomes are
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 134 05-01-2012 09:38:26