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Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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TIME PREFERENCE AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE<br />

dimensions of individual behaviour, especially in an intertemporal context.<br />

Individual choices and behaviour are in part the result of objective<br />

factors and circumstances. Th e individual free<strong>do</strong>m depends on individual<br />

access to social primary goods: the possibility for individuals to conceive<br />

and develop conception of the good life depends also on the possession of<br />

suffi cient social conditions. [8] In Political Liberalism, Rawls himself developed<br />

a “needs principle” (Wolf, 2009), that is to say the necessity to assure<br />

suffi cient social conditions for all, in order to guarantee equal liberty for all.<br />

He recognized then that individuals need to benefi t from suffi cient social<br />

conditions to have the capacity to be free:<br />

the fi rst principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily<br />

be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizen’s basic needs be<br />

met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand<br />

and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties. Certainly any<br />

such principle must be assumed in applying the fi rst principle (Rawls, 1993).<br />

As the same, the individual capacity to project himself in time, to<br />

think about future, to make plans, are both conditioned and allowed by his<br />

present possibilities. [9] One of the main aspects of individual precariousness<br />

is the diffi culty to make plans for future, to have long-term projects. [10] We<br />

are able to conceive and develop our conception of good life for our future<br />

only if we have now an access to social primary goods.<br />

In parallel, capacity of the members of future generations to conceive<br />

and develop their own conception of good life depends on social conditions<br />

they will inherit. Traditionally, sustainable development is thought<br />

through an implicit opposition between present and future interests and<br />

needs. Th e research of a just allocation of resources in time through the<br />

determination of a just saving rate illustrates such a thing. A just saving<br />

rate is assumed to require from individuals a minimal sacrifi ce to insure to<br />

next generations suffi cient conditions of life. Introducing then a social time<br />

preference in this research of a just allocation of resources in time appears<br />

8 By social primary goods, we mean all resources necessary to conceive and develop his own<br />

conception of good life (access to health, education, etc.).<br />

9 We have to notice that according to Rawls, conceptions of the good are by hypothesis long-term<br />

projects (Rawls, 1999: 408).<br />

10 Many studies show a correlation between social precariousness and the capacity to have longterm<br />

projects. See per example the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu about Algerian workers (Bourdieu,<br />

1963) or the economist Emily Lawrence and her experimentation about the correlation<br />

between poverty and time horizon (Lawrence, 1991).<br />

<strong>Diacritica</strong> <strong>25</strong>-2_<strong>Filosofia</strong>.<strong>indb</strong> 57 05-01-2012 09:38:21<br />

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