Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

14
Introduction
BERIL SÖZMEN IDEMEN
Th e leading question of this article concerns the position of the putative
father in cases of unintended pregnancies and discusses whether a woman
can be thought of as morally obligated [1] to relieve the father of fatherhood,
either by having an abortion or by legally terminating his parental rights
and obligations. More specifi cally, I aim to consider cases, in which a man
and a woman [2] are faced with a pregnancy, which the pregnant woman
wants to be continued but the prospective father does not. As such, this
discussion is part of debates around reproductive rights in general and
abortion in particular. It is concerned however, not with the more common
question of how a woman who wants or has an abortion is to be evaluated
morally but rather with the question as to whether a woman can be thought
of as morally obligated to have an abortion or to choose single motherhood.
Th e most common questions appearing in debates around abortion are
those concerning the foetus’ status and women’s rights. What is neglected
is the question of becoming a parent in general and becoming a father in
particular. Th ese questions, I shall argue, are related to attitudes about the
good life as well as autonomy and consent. I shall begin with an attempt to
specify the morally relevant factors in cases of abortion, partly by leaning
on the work already done in well-known articles by Judith Jarvis Th omson,
the virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse and the care ethicist, Michael Slote.
I shall argue that these three thinkers persuasively demonstrate that there
are a number of cases in which abortion is morally permitted. Based on the
points they raise, I will discuss whether it can be argued that there are certain
cases in which the pregnant woman is morally obligated to relieve the
putative father of fatherhood. Finally, I will briefl y discuss the bearing that
the moral evaluation of such cases has for legislation around abortion.
Th e most common cases of men appearing in debates around abortion
are those, which attempt to prevent women from having an abortion, at
times by declaring that they will relieve the mother of all the responsibility
of child-rearing once the child is born (Sharrin 1990). Otherwise the
fi gure of the man is oft en blurry, indistinct and neglected or it is depicted
as the personifi cation of patriarchy, imposing its will on women and their
1 I use the term ‘morally obligated’ in the sense that abortion is what a successful moral agent in
virtue ethicist and care ethicist terms would choose to do under those circumstances.
2 Some of the points that are going to be raised apply also to lesbian couples. But since two of the
main points, i.e. the use of one’s sperm and choosing biological parenthood are as yet restricted
to male bodies, I will not include lesbian couples in this discussion.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 14 05-01-2012 09:38:18