Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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5. Possible global solutions to spectrum cases
OSCAR HORTA
Th e way in which the problem at stake here can be approached will vary
signifi cantly depending of which one of the methodological perspectives
presented above we assume. In this section I will examine what solutions
may be given to this problem according to each of these perspectives.
(i) Considering Only Particular Preferences towards Outcomes. At fi rst
sight, an obvious candidate to be the most preferable option is A 1 . Th e
sum of the local intuitions we have when we compare consecutive pairs
of alternatives in the spectrum would drive us to conclude this. However,
if we reject all the constraints any principle may impose, we do not need
to accept this. We no longer need to add our local intuitions. We just need
to take into account the intuitions we may have towards diff erent pairs of
outcomes. According to this approach, in each evaluation of a certain pair
of outcomes we are not constrained by what principles may tell us about
which one is preferable. Given this, we may reject A 1 if we have the intuition
that another option is better than it. Th ere are several possible solutions
alternative to this one that those who are just concerned with intuitions
towards outcomes can assume.
Suppose we have an intransitive set of intuitions regarding the betterness
of diff erent outcomes: A>B>C>A. It may happen that when we look
closely at the problem, we discover that the degree to which we think one
alternative is better than another one may vary when we consider diff erent
pairs of alternatives. So we may think A is slightly better than B and B
slightly better than C, but C strongly better than A. Th is set could then be
represented as follows: A> 1 B> 1 C> 10 A. In light of this, we could decide to
choose C as the strongest option. And we may try to do the same in the
spectrum case we are considering here. Accordingly, we might think that
the strongest preference would be the one we have for A n over A 1 , and conclude,
due to it, that A n is the best option.
Th is solution, however, would be problematic. A n-1 seems to be better
than A n , and in fact it also seems to be intuitively much better than A 1 . But
then, where should we stop? A n-2 seems to be even better. In light of this
problem, we may simply assume that we just need to take into account our
direct intuitions regarding each of the available options over the next one in
the spectrum. But this leaves us with no candidate for global betterness.
Th ere is a way, however, in which we may try to look for a solution for
this problem. In spectrum cases such as the ones we have seen here, A n
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 132 05-01-2012 09:38:25