Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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BERIL SÖZMEN IDEMEN
example, Th omson argues that it is not a case of murder and therefore morally
permissible to unplug oneself from the innocent being whose use of
one’s body leads to one’s death (Th omson 1986: 41). Granting the foetus the
status of personhood for the sake of argument, the innocence of persons
involved is deemed crucial in this debate: Since neither the child nor the
mother are in the life-threatening situation they are in because of any fault
of theirs, their interests ought to be regarded in the same way.
Th is line of argumentation leads to peculiar conclusions however. It
seems to imply that the interest of an involved party who can rightly be
judged as ‘guilty’ or ‘vicious’ should be disregarded in favour of the interest
of those who were ‘innocent’ or ‘virtuous’. Assuming that the mother led a
blameless life, was healthy and responsible, used all possible precautions
against becoming pregnant and conceived nevertheless, then she should be
allowed an abortion. Assuming that both the pregnancy and the fact that
it is life-threatening to the mother are direct results of the life-style of the
mother, of irresponsibility or unhealthy habits then her pregnancy should
be considered her ‘fault’ and she should not be allowed to have an abortion.
Th is would be an absurd conclusion to end up with; not least because
a practice based on this argumentation would force the very mothers or
couples to become parents who have demonstrated a lack of maturity and
responsibility. Th e alleged ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ of the persons involved in
an unintended pregnancy should therefore be regarded as irrelevant when
considering an abortion and we should, for all ends and purposes, take everyone
to be ‘innocent’ when considering what had best be done. Th is point
is relevant to the question concerning the position of the putative father as
it rejects the depiction of the man as the active and responsible party in the
matter who is therefore held accountable should it come to an unintended
pregnancy.
Hursthouse’s virtue ethicist approach puts more weight on the issue of
the virtues and vices that lead to a pregnancy: “What ‘gets one into those
circumstances’ in the case of abortion is, except in the case of rape, one’s
sexual activity and one’s choices, or the lack of them, about one’s sexual
partner and about contraception” (Hursthouse 1997: 235). If it was ‘the
fault’ of the prospective parents that they found themselves in the situation
where to choose abortion was the best decision, they are nevertheless
bound to feel guilt and remorse about the character traits that resulted in an
unwanted pregnancy (Idem). It is important to remark, as Hursthouse does,
that such ‘faulty’ character traits are not by necessity female ones. Th ere is
no doubt that in the process that leads to a birth, “nature bears harder on
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 18 05-01-2012 09:38:18