Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho
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148<br />
RUI SILVA<br />
emotions and virtue; virtues are not only dispositions to action, but also<br />
to moderate our emotions or to feel in a certain way. From an Aristotelian<br />
standpoint, “having the right emotions is necessary for being a good person”<br />
(Stocker, 1996: 174).<br />
Th e important connections between value and emotions are another<br />
sign of the ethical importance of emotions. In fact, many emotions contain<br />
an evaluation of their object (anger, love, for instance), and the lack<br />
of emotions may lead to a devaluation of other beings (as the existence of<br />
psychopaths demonstrates). As Stocker (1996: 177) put it, correct emotions<br />
lead to correct evaluations and incorrect emotions make it diffi cult to make<br />
correct evaluations. Th e relevance of emotions for virtue ethics can be also<br />
illustrated by Hume’s defence of sympathy and Schopenhauer’s defence of<br />
compassion as the basis of morality.<br />
Today, it is no longer a speculation to claim that emotions play a fundamental<br />
role in our decision-making processes; this point is widely acknowledged<br />
by neuroscientists. So, when we say that practical reason requires a<br />
certain form of upbringing or personal development, we should bear in<br />
mind the Aristotelian idea that such a process must involve the education<br />
or training of emotions. Th e humanist idea of Bildung is, once more, very<br />
useful in this context, especially if we consider Schillers’ thesis that Bildung<br />
requires not only philosophical culture, but also aesthetic education. Bildung<br />
was considered an intellectual and aff ective process.<br />
3. It seems legitimate to consider communitarianism as a natural translation<br />
of virtue ethics into the <strong>do</strong>main of political philosophy; the work<br />
of MacIntyre provides a good illustration of the similarities between both<br />
movements. In order to clarify this point, it is convenient to sketch out a<br />
brief characterization of communitarianism. It is usual to defi ne communitarianism<br />
in contrast with liberalism, and this contrast can be made at<br />
diff erent levels:<br />
– at the ethical level, there is a defence of particularism and of the thesis<br />
that the ends and values involved in moral reasoning have a social origin;<br />
– at the anthropological level, communitarian authors criticize individualistic<br />
and atomistic conceptions of the self;<br />
– at the political level, it is argued that the goods favoured by a community<br />
should play an important role in political decisions;<br />
– fi nally, communitarians denounce liberalism’s internal tensions or<br />
“pragmatic contradiction”: far from being neutral regarding the diff erent<br />
conceptions of the good, liberalism belongs to a particular tradition.<br />
<strong>Diacritica</strong> <strong>25</strong>-2_<strong>Filosofia</strong>.<strong>indb</strong> 148 05-01-2012 09:38:27