Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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CLAUDIA REITINGER
lates the person’s rights. Th is strategy looks promising because it does not
lead to the counter-intuitive consequences of utilitarianism and gives an
explanation why an action can be wrong in Non-Identity cases.
Another promising account is the rejection of (2). Th e Non-Identity
Problem relies on a comparative account of harm, which holds that a necessary
condition of harming is that an action causes a person to be worse off .
On an alternative account being worse- off is not a necessary condition for
harming a person. A person is also harmed if he or she falls below a certain
threshold.
In the following sections I will outline the latter two solutions. Firstly
I will discuss one possibility of replacing (2) and redefi ning harm in noncomparative
terms. Secondly I will discuss the possibility to replace (1)
through an appeal to the rights of future people. I will give an argument
why the appeal to future people’s rights is superior to the redefi nition of
harm.
2.1. Rethinking the concept of harm
Th e Non-Identity Problem rests on a comparative account of harm. An
action harms a person only if it makes the person worse off . Because this
condition is not fulfi lled in Non-Identity cases some theorists have argued
that the comparative account of harm is mistaken (Shiff rin, 1999; Meyer,
2005, 2009; Hanser, 2009; Harman, 2009). In the following I will discuss
Meyers (2005) proposal.
Meyer distinguishes three defi nitions of harm:
(I) (hypothetical-threshold) An action (or inaction) at time t harms a
1
person only if this action causes that the quality of life of that persons falls
below a specifi ed threshold.
(II) (diachronic) An action (or inaction) at time t harms a person only if
1
the agent causes (allows) this person to be worse off at some later time t than 2
the person was before t1 (III) (subjunctive-historical) An action (or inaction) at time t harms a
1
person only if the agent causes (or allows) this person to be worse- off at some
later time t than the person would have been at t had the agent not interacted
2 2
with (or acted with respect to) this person at all (Meyer, 2005: 37). [1]
1 Th e translation from German to English is based on Meyers (2008) article ‚Intergenerational
Justice’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 68 05-01-2012 09:38:21