Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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son cannot be a ethical exemplar (i.e. a practically wise person). Th is kind of
response points to a deeper debate in virtue ethics, or virtue theory, that has
only recently begun to surface. Th is has to do with whether or not virtue ethics
represents a sort of ethical elitism. My theory is thus about as non-elitist as
one could hope for. Aristotle’s theory (VE) requires a great deal of intellectual
development and ethical sophistication for an agent to possess any virtue. Only
the phronomoi, the (practically) wise, are virtuous, and these people are few
and far between. […] Th ose (i.e. the supporters of VE) who argue that virtue is
[…] limited to the phronimoi, paradoxically move virtue out of the normative
plane. Virtue must be (directly, not only through the insight of the wise) accessible
– to those who are not wise but kind; to those who had the misfortune to
grow up in repressive environments that warped their understanding, yet who
are capable of showing the appropriate compassionate responses to human suffering;
to those who, like most of us, possess some intellectual or ethical fl aw. [7]
(Driver, 2001: 54-5)
Driver’s vivid rhetoric captures our impulses against ethical elitism well.
She thinks, however that although the sheer counter-intuitiveness of elitism
is a good reason for revising VE on its own, it is not the only reason.
According to Driver, the inability of VE to acknowledge certain common-sense
intuitions, [8] especially about the virtuousness of modesty (one’s
underestimation of her own worth), [9] counts against elitism. Driver argues
that most people are not mistaken in holding that modesty is a virtue. In
spite of being based on the ignorance of one’s own worth, modesty, Driver
proposes, could be considered a virtue due to the good it systematically
produces. [10] Th us, if we want to take our appreciation of modest people
seriously, and why should we not, we would better to break the bond
between virtuousness and acting from virtue. In order to be modest and
therefore virtuous, one must not to act from virtue, but from the underestimation.
Since underestimation is a cognitive fl aw, and since a practically
wise person (i.e. a person who systematically acts from virtue) could therefore
hardly underestimate her own worth, the virtue of modesty would be
7 I have added the words in (brackets) to put Drivers’ argument into its context. I shall follow this
practice with my other quotations as well.
8 In addition of modestly, Driver (2001) lists blind charity, trust, forgetful forgiveness and impulsive
courage as the virtues of ignorance in Ch. 2. I think, however, that they can be shown to not
presuppose ignorance by the similar argument I use here in connection with modesty. Cf. my
discussion on trust on pp. 18-21 below.
9 Driver 2001, pp. xvi and 16-29. Cf. Schueler 1999, according to which modesty is not a virtue
based on a cognitive defect, but on one’s systematic disinterest towards emphasizing her own
accomplishments and the lack of concern about others’ reactions towards them.
10 See Driver 2001, pp. 24-28
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 84 05-01-2012 09:38:22