Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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CLAUDIA REITINGER
a very high level of well being. Can one reasonably state that in this case
future people have been harmed through our policy? If we are egalitarians
we can state that our behaviour is wrong or unfair. But it seems implausible
to hold that our action harms future persons although they enjoy a high
level of well being and have a really good life. Th is is because the concept of
justice is more extensional than the concept of harm. Th erefore the threshold
conception of harm is not open to all principles of justice, as for example
egalitarian considerations. If we want to stick to our normal language
use, the only appropriate specifi cation of the threshold is by means of a
suffi citarian principle.
Th us, we have two possibilities for specifying the threshold. Either we
leave the threshold notion open for diff erent principles of distributive justice.
In that case we face the problem that we have to judge actions as harmful
that we normally would not consider as such. Th e Non-Identity Problem
is solved through a mere stipulation of the term harm. Or we refrain from
broadening our notion of harm and hold the view that only a suffi citarian
specifi cation of the threshold is appropriate. Th e diffi culty with this view is
that the solution of the Non-Identity problem through a threshold notion
of harm presupposes that suffi citarianism is the only adequate theory for
intergenerational justice.
If the Non-Identity Problem could only be solved through the rejection
of (2), thus through a redefi nition of harm, this would be an interesting
result. In that case the Non-Identity Problem would exclude the application
of all principles of justice except suffi citarian principles. Because the rejection
of (2) is not the only possibility of solving the Non-Identity Problem,
the result that only suffi citarian principles are an adequate specifi cation
of the threshold, is problematic. Th ere is at least one other solution to the
Non-Identity Problem that does not favour a specifi c principle of justice
namely the appeal to future people’s rights. If this account is open to diff erent
principles of justice it is superior to the redefi nition of harm.
2.3. Solving the non-identity problem through an appeal to future
people’s rights
Several theorists have argued that the Non-Identity Problem can be solved
through an appeal to the rights of future people (Woodward, 1986; Smolkin,
1994, 1999). Woodward argues that, since the violation of rights does not
necessarily involve a decline for the worse in one’s welfare, future people
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 72 05-01-2012 09:38:22