Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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5. A more promising proposal
HASSE HÄMÄLÄINEN
So far we have dealt with VEE in very idealised conditions. All the above arguments
have been based on the thought that provided that the moral insight
of the practically wise really is, as Aristotle supposes, more reliable than anyone
else’s, then the non-practically wise people, who have an opportunity to
appeal to the criteria of practical wisdom (i.e. virtues) defi ned by that insight
lack good reason to attempt to see who is practically wise without appealing
to those criteria. I doubt, however, if this implication even follows from
Aristotle’s supposition. Before I will argue for my doubt, I will demonstrate,
however, that were the implication like that, the application of Aristotle’s supposition
would result problems in the actual world, and that these potential
problems explain a great deal of our intuitions against VEE.
I suggest that the source for our intuitions against VEE is in its implications
for trust. Provided that VEE implies that non-practically wise people
have no good reasons to fi nd out who is practically wise, then they would
have very little reason to trust anyone who claims to be practically wise.
One cannot be expected to blindly trust someone’s virtuousness due to the
unfortunate fact that in the actual world, all the humans are not as virtuous
as they claim to be. Medical elitism does not arouse trust, because it would
allow the medical experts to use their powers to deceive the non-experts. [18]
In the same vein, VEE would open that possibility to the persons pretending
to be practically wise. Th ough the truly practically wise do of course not
systematically act with a view of deceiving the others, as deception is only
appropriate in very special and unusual contexts, presumably a great many
evil people would be tempted to name each other as practically wise in
order to deceive the others by providing them mischievous guidance. If the
non-practically wise had assumed that they have no good reason to attempt
to see who is practically wise, it would be virtually impossible for them to
distinguish those who have agreed to call one another practically wise with
a view of deceiving the others from those who really are wise and hence
rightfully call one another by such title. Th is possibility of deception would
give those non-practically wise compelling reasons not to trust anyone who
claims to possess practical wisdom and hence reliably see the demands of
virtue. Trust in the contrary assumption that one has compelling reasons to
appeal to the demands of virtue defi ned by the practically wise is, however,
what makes VE to make sense. Th erefore VEE would contradict VE.
18 See O’Neil 2002, esp. pp. 118-123 & 151
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 90 05-01-2012 09:38:23