Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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OSCAR HORTA
considerably shorter time. For some, this may be counterintuitive, whereas
for others it may be an appealing solution. [7] At any rate, this would not be
relevant here – note that according to this view it would be our intuitions
towards principles, not outcomes, that would count.
Finally, we may think that a certain principle has lexical priority. If
the principle is quality, then the best solution will be A n . If the principle is
quantity, then A 1 will be the best solution.
All these solutions are ones that those who defend transitivity can
accept (including the critical levels one). But they are also compatible with
views that leave room to intransitivity. Th is may seem strange at fi rst sight,
because these approaches can provide us with solutions that can salvage
transitivity from some objections that defenders of intransitivity pose
against it. But this does not make these approaches incompatible with the
idea that betterness is intransitive.
(iii) Considering Outcomes and Principles. As we have seen, there are
others who believe that the best way to know what is better for us consists in
giving weight both to our intuitions regarding outcomes and our intuitions
regarding principles. Th ose who assume this may accept almost any of the
solutions that could be proposed according to the previous two approaches.
Th e actual one they will maintain will depend on the intuitions to which
they give more weight. Th e only possible solution they would have to reject
is the one consisting in arbitrarily choosing any alternative in the spectrum.
Th e reason is simple: if any solution is valid according to a consideration of
our intuitions towards outcomes, and we take into account both our intuitions
towards outcomes and towards principles, then a consideration of
what any intuitively acceptable principle prescribes will make a diff erence
and point at some particular outcome as the one to choose.
Also, those who combine our direct preferences regarding outcomes
with the critical level view of principles could propose yet another solution.
Th ey would defend that the best options would be those higher than A p and
lower than A q . But then, if they are not willing to rank their local preferences
for the sake of getting a global preference, they may claim that we
cannot really make our minds regarding which of those options would be
the best one. So they would accept any option between A p and A q .
7 Th is has a counterintuitive consequence: it entails that A n is probably as bad as A 1 (since both
are far beyond the critical levels). To avoid this, we could introduce a critical level with respect
to quality, but not to with respect to quantity. Th e solution would be the same: the best solution
would be A p . However, it would be a somehow arbitrary move.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 136 05-01-2012 09:38:26