Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

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CLAUDIA REITINGER
had chosen conservation and that it would be much lower compared with
the well- being of people living today. Clearly the depletion policy is wrong
if we are strict egalitarians. According to egalitarianism future people have
the right to enjoy a level of well being (or a level of resources) that is at least
as high as the level of our well being. Th e depletion policy would violate
the rights of future people, which follow from egalitarian principles. Th us,
people living today have the duty not to choose the depletion polity. For
suffi citarians the wrongness of the depletion policy depends on the level of
well being future people are able to enjoy under this policy. If the depletion
causes future people to live a life below the specifi ed threshold, depletion is
wrong. Th e reason for wrongness is that that depletion policy will cause the
existence of people whose suffi citarian rights are not fulfi lled. If the depletion
lowers their quality of life but does not lead to a life below the threshold
according to suffi ciarianism the rights of future people are not violated.
Th e discussion of this example shows the following. Th e solution of the
Non-Identity Problem through an appeal to future people’s rights is purely
formal. It cannot give us any information about the content of the rights of
future people and therefore can tell us nothing about our duties towards
them. Th e specifi cation of rights lies on another level of proof. What special
duties do parents have towards their children and why? How should we
weigh the rights of the future child against the parent’s rights? What do we
owe to our descendants? Which principles of distributive justice should be
applied in question concerning intergenerational justice? Once we can give
good reasons for adopting certain moral principles resp. principles of distributive
justice, we can determine which rights future people will have and
which duties we have towards them. As mentioned above, the openness of
this solution is an advantage compared to a redefi nition of harm. Th rough
an appeal to future people’s rights the question of adequate principles of
justice can be separated from the solution of the Non-Identity Problem.
2.4. Arguments against the rights based solution
In this last part I want to address three objections against the solution of
replacing (1) through an appeal to the rights of future people.
Th e fi rst objection raised by Boonin is that (1’) is too wide (apud
Boonin, 2008: 142). Because everyone who lives will have some of his rights
violated one day, (1’) would lead to the conclusion that it is morally wrong
to conceive a child under any circumstances. Th ere are two replies to this
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 74 05-01-2012 09:38:22