Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb - cehum - Universidade do Minho

96
MARIA JOÃO CABRITA
e o seu relevo no debate contemporâneo das relações internacionais (idealismo
versus realismo); em seguida, analiso o contributo de “Th e Law of Peoples” (1999)
para esta discussão, enfatizando os signifi cados da “paz por satisfação”, termo que
Rawls toma de empréstimo a Raymond Aron (1962), e das noções de “paz justa”e
de “dever de assistência” - conceitos-chave da teoria não ideal da Lei dos Povos que
comprovam a ideia politica de paz rawlsiana.
Palavras-chave: utopia realista, paz democrática, paz por satisfação, paz justa,
dever de assistência
Th e idea of democratic peace, which is the corner-stone of the liberal vision
of international relations, is rooted in the Kantian idea of foedus pacifi cum
and its foundation on peaceful character of republics, of the socializing
force of international trade and the role of the political public space, as
presented by this philosopher in “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”
(1795). Conscious that peace as “the end of all hostilities” (Kant, 1795: 107) is
an ethical duty that must be performed in order to comply with the imperative
of respect for any person and, in that person, for humanity; and, consequently,
of urgency in establishing the state of peace among men, Kant enunciated the
guiding rules of the relationships between states that foster their mutual
trust, in the six preliminary articles for perpetual peace [1] ; following with
the presentation of the essential provisions for its implementation and
expansion, in the three defi nitive articles for perpetual peace.
Based on the maxim “the exercise of the human relationship must be
conforming to the law”, the three defi nitive articles for a perpetual peace
are concerned with the public law in its basic forms: domestic (ius civitatis),
international (ius gentium) and cosmopolitan (ius cosmopoliticum). Th e fi rst
article requires that the civil constitution of the state be republican – this
is a political society that, from a legal point of view, articulates the moral
1 “1. No treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the secret reservation of material
for a future war. (…)
2. No state having an independent existence – whether it be great or small – shall be acquired
by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation. (…)
3. Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall be abolished in course of time. (…)
4. \No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the external aff airs of the state. (…)
5. No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another. (…).
6. No state at war with another shall countenance such modes of hostility as would make mutual
confi dence impossible in a subsequent state of peace: such are the employment of assassins
(percussores) or of poisoners (venefi ci), breaches of capitulation, the instigating and making use
of treachery (perduellio) in the hostile state”, in Kant, 1795: 107-114.
Diacritica 25-2_Filosofia.indb 96 05-01-2012 09:38:23