Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METHOD IN METAPHYSICS 89Fifteenth Aporia (1003 a 5–17)Are the principles of things universals or particulars?This is perhaps <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s most central aporia in metaphysics, and it willoccupy us at length in Chapter 7, especially §5v, viii, ix and x. The aporiais whether the principles, i.e. the ultimate explanations, for whichmetaphysics is searching, are universals or particulars. On the one hand, itappears that they must be universals; for explanations are universal andrequire the reality of universals. So reality will be intelligible and subject toexplanation only if principles are universals. On the other hand, it appearsthat what primarily is are particulars; for universals are real only in virtueof there being particulars that they are true of. But how can primary beingbe one thing, i.e. the particulars, but the primary object of knowledge be adifferent thing, i.e. the universals? Certainly <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that theprimary object of knowledge, i.e. what is intelligible and subject toexplanation, must at the same time be what primarily is—primary being.