Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

116 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEINGshares, or by assuming that he thinks that a thing’s essence is somethingthat it does not share, with other things of the same general kind.So what does <strong>Aristotle</strong>, in the Categories, think is the ultimate subject ofpredication with regard to each thing, since he thinks that it is neither theessence of the thing nor the accidental properties of the thing? He answersthat the ultimate subject of predication with regard to each thing is theparticular (to kath’ hekaston) which this thing is; for example, the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to Socrates is the particular thing whichSocrates is. In general, <strong>Aristotle</strong> uses the term ‘particular’ (to kath’hekaston) in contrast to the term ‘universal’ (katholou): a universal issomething that can be predicated of (i.e. be true of) other things, andmany things; but a particular is something that is not capable of beingpredicated of other things. So evidently a particular is an ultimate subjectof predication.<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s theory in the Categories can be summarized as follows:CAT1. The ultimate subject of predication with regard to each thingis a particular.CAT2. The essence with regard to each thing is a universal,namely, the general kind to which the thing belongs. (He rejects thisview in the Metaphysics.)Therefore,CAT3. The ultimate subject of predication with regard to each thingis different from the essence of the thing. (He rejects this view in theMetaphysics, where he argues that the essence and the ultimatesubject of predication are one thing, not two different things.)But the theory of the Categories, just as that of the Metaphysics, is a theoryabout primary being (prōtē ousia, often simply ousia); and the main claimin the Categories is that:CAT4. Primary being with regard to each thing is the ultimatesubject of predication with regard to that thing.But since he thinks that the ultimate subject of predication is differentfrom the essence (i.e. CAT3), he concludes that:CAT5. Primary being with regard to each thing is not the essence ofthe thing. (He rejects this view in the Metaphysics, where he argues