Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

222 THE SEARCH FOR PRIMARY BEINGhe will conclude that primary being with regard to each changing, materialthing is both:(1) the essence and the form of that thing, and(2) the ultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing.Finally, he will conclude that primary being with regard to each thing isnot the universals that are true of that thing and that determine what thething is like.Let us focus once again on <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s basic reasoning for the view thatprimary being with regard to each thing is the essence of that thing. Thereasoning is that the essence of a thing is what explains what it is for thatthing to be the determinate and well-defined thing it is. But <strong>Aristotle</strong>argues that by explaining what it is for a thing to be the determinate and welldefinedthing it is, the essence also explains what it is for that thing to be abeing, something that is, in the first place. This reasoning becomes fullyexplicit only at the end of book VII (in VII. 17). The argument in VII. 17is along the following lines. First, <strong>Aristotle</strong> clarifies that ‘primary being[ousia] is a principle and a certain kind of explanation [or cause, aitia]’(1041 a 9–10). For it is the explanation of why a thing is a being, somethingthat is. Second, he argues that this explanation is provided by the essence ofeach thing (to ti ēn einai, 1041 a 28). For the essence of each thing is whatexplains why the thing is the very thing it is; and, by doing so, the essenceexplains also why the thing is a being, something that is. Third, he arguesthat the essence of each thing, and in particular each changing, materialthing, explains why the thing is the very thing it is in the following way: itexplains why the matter of a particular material thing, e.g. a human being,constitutes the very thing that it constitutes, e.g. a particular human being(1041 b 4–9). This argument evidently assumes what was argued for earlier(in VII. 10–12), namely, that the essence of a changing, material thing isthe form of that thing. Fourth, he repeats that this explanation, theessence, is primary being, ousia (104 b 8–9). Finally, and strikingly, heconcludes: ‘this [the essence] is the primary being of each thing; for this[the primary being, and the essence] is the ultimate explanation [aitionprōton] of its being [i.e. of why the thing is a being, something that is, in thefirst place]’ (1041 b 27–28).This brings out most clearly that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s basic argument for the viewthat primary being with regard to each thing is the essence of that thing isof the following form: the essence of a thing is what explains what it is forthat thing to be the determinate and well-defined thing that it is; but byexplaining what it is for a thing to be the determinate and well-defined