Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

54 THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS OF ALL THINGSis that which is potentially (dunamei) a particular material thing of acertain form. This means that matter is that which has the capacity tobecome a particular material thing of a certain form. (We will return in amoment to <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s peculiar and puzzling conception of matter aspotentiality.)(3) THE SOURCE OF THE CHANGE AND ESPECIALLY OF THEGENERATION OF A THING (TO KINOUN)This is commonly referred to as ‘the moving cause’ or ‘the efficient cause’.We saw that a particular thing, e.g. a human being, is generated out of itsmatter. But what generates a particular thing, e.g. a human being, in thefirst place? <strong>Aristotle</strong> argues that what generates a particular thing is analready generated thing that belongs to the same general kind, e.g. analready generated human being. So an adult human being, the ‘parent’,generates a new human being, the ‘offspring’. In particular, he argues thatit is the form of an already generated thing, e.g. the form of an adulthuman being, that generates a new thing of the same kind, e.g. a newhuman being. In this way he argues that forms are changeless not onlywith regard to each particular thing, but also with regard to all things. Onthe one hand, a particular human being has the same unchanging form foras long as it exists; on the other hand, this form is passed down from parentto offspring in a series of generations which he thinks is infinite bothforwards and backwards in time. But it is especially important toemphasize <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s view that it is not simply the parent that generatesthe offspring (so much is stating what is evident), but the form of theparent; i.e. it is the form of an already formed thing that explains why anew thing is generated. This also shows that it is misleading to associate<strong>Aristotle</strong>’s conception of the ‘moving’ or ‘generating’ cause with a modernconception of an ‘efficient’ cause. For the modern conception of anefficient cause does not involve the supposition that it is the form of athing that is such a cause.(4) THE END (TELOS) AT WHICH THE GENERATION OF ATHING IS DIRECTEDThis is commonly referred to as the final cause. The end (telos) at whichthe generation of a particular thing, e.g. a particular human being, isdirected is evidently that particular thing. But why does <strong>Aristotle</strong> think thatthis end is an explanation and cause of something? It is because he arguesthat a particular process of generation, e.g. the process of generation of a