Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF CHANGE: GOD 287recognition and desire by the cosmos would not lead it to be active or tomove at all, but would, if anything, rather lead it to imitate the ultimatecause of change by standing completely still. What this brings out, onceagain, is that the cosmos, when it is caused to move by the ultimate causeof change, imitates the ultimate cause of change, i.e. it behaves so as to belike the ultimate cause of change. This is why the ultimate cause of changemust be active, i.e. so that the cosmos, in imitating it, can itself be active inthe way that is appropriate for a thing of its kind, namely, by moving in aneverlasting, uniform and circular motion. This kind of final causation—causation by imitating the cause and behaving so as to be as like as possibleto it, shows that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s conception of the ultimate cause of change, forall its differences, is thoroughly Platonic.But why does the activity of the ultimate cause of change consist ofrational thought (noēsis)? It is notable that <strong>Aristotle</strong> does little to clarifythis and seems to assume from the start that rational thought is thedistinctive activity of the ultimate cause of change. All he says is that‘reason (nous) appears to be the most divine thing that we are familiar with’(1074 b 15–16), i.e. the most perfect thing. So it is appropriate that theactivity of the ultimate cause of change, since it is the activity of the mostperfect thing, should consist of the activity of reason, which is rationalthought. In fact this goes to the heart of the matter, for the ultimate causeof change is the most perfect thing in that it is the perfect example ofsomething rational—the supreme object of rational thought (the noēton).But it appears wholly appropriate that if reason is something active, thenits activity should consist of rational thought. This also throws furtherlight on why the ultimate cause of change must be active; this is not justbecause what it causes in the cosmos is activity and motion, but becausewhat it causes in the cosmos is rational activity and motion, i.e. activityand motion that is subject to explanation. So the activity of the ultimatecause of change cannot after all be distinguished from its rational activity,and this is why this activity is nothing but the activity of reason, namely,rational thought.But we may also clarify why the activity of the ultimate cause of changeis rational thought by pointing out that, for <strong>Aristotle</strong>, rational thought isthe best example of an activity that is immaterial and does not depend onanything material or bodily. This contrasts with obviously materialactivities, such as the motion in space of material bodies, but also withactivities which, although they are mental and belong to the soul, dependon the body, such as sense perception, imagination, and indeed most, if notall, kinds of human thinking. Thus in the De Anima (III. 4), when<strong>Aristotle</strong> considered the human intellect and rational thought, he argued