Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

100 BEING QUA BEING AND PRIMARY BEINGbetween things that are beings in virtue of themselves (i.e. primary beings)and things that are beings in virtue of their relation to those things (i.e.non-primary beings). For then we can, apparently, conceive of being, as awhole and qua being, in the following way: by supposing that anythingthat is, i.e. any being, is a being either in virtue of itself and not in virtue ofits relation to other things (in which case it is a primary being) or in virtueof its relation to a primary being (in which case it is a non-primary being).This will enable us to conceive of being, as a whole and qua being, notbecause we will be able to distinguish being from something outside it orfrom what is inside it, but because it will enable us to point directly to, asit were, the source of all beings: that which explains what it is forsomething, anything, to be. (We should remember that this was preciselythe question distinctive to metaphysics as characterized in IV. 1: ‘What isit for something, anything, to be?’) For now we can say the following. Aprimary being is something that is a being simply in virtue of itself and notin virtue of its relation to other things; and this is because a primary beingexplains directly what it is for it itself to be. A non-primary being, on theother hand, is something that is a being in virtue of its relation to, and sodependent on, a primary being; and this is because a primary beingindirectly explains also what it is for other things (the non-primary beings)to be, i.e. things that are beings in virtue of their relation to, and sodependent on, the primary beings.It is worth emphasizing that this way of conceiving of being, as a wholeand qua being, is not subject to the previous incoherence. For thedistinction of beings into primary beings and non-primary beings is,precisely, not a distinction between different things simply in so far as theyare all beings. If it were, then the previous incoherence would re-emerge.So the distinction of beings into primary beings and non-primary beings isnot at all like the attempt, previously, to distinguish beings simply in so faras they are beings into, for example, changing and changeless beings—theattempt that led to incoherence.Let us look closer at why the incoherence does not re-emerge. If wedistinguish beings simply in so far as they are beings into, for example,changing and changeless beings, we are thereby supposing twothings. First, there is something that constitutes what it is to be a being, andthis belongs equally to changing and changeless beings. Second, there issomething that distinguishes changing from changeless beings, such thatthis distinguishing feature, precisely, distinguishes different things in so faras they are all beings. This is just as if we distinguish things in so far asthey are plants into e.g. roses and other plants, we are thereby supposingtwo things. First, there is something that constitutes what it is to be a