Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

154 THE DEFENCE OF PNCview that all contradictions are true from the view that somecontradictions are true (see §6 of this chapter). Furthermore, while evidentlythe claim that ‘Some contradictions cannot be true’ does not entail theclaim that ‘No contradictions can be true’, perhaps <strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks,without obvious fallacy, that the claim that ‘Some contradictions, namelythose involving the essence of a thing, cannot be true’ entails, or at leastprovides reason for thinking, that ‘No contradictions can be true’.How can the claim that ‘With regard to its essence, E, a thing cannot beboth E and not-E’ provide reason for thinking, as in <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s originalaim, that ‘With regard to any property, F, a thing cannot be both F andnot-F’? Here we need to recall that <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s original aim was rather todefend the claim that ‘With regard to any property, F, a thing cannot beboth F and not-F at the same time and in one and the same respect.’ Heemphasizes this qualification, and we have seen that it is crucial (see §§1and 6 of this chapter). But we have also seen that, apparently, <strong>Aristotle</strong>thinks that in order to deny that PNC is true of a thing, x, i.e. in order toargue that there are true contradictions with regard to a thing, x, one mustargue that this thing, x, is so radically indeterminate that it is not possibleto distinguish a particular respect in which it may be either F or not-F butnot both F and not-F.This, if anything, provides the key to <strong>Aristotle</strong>’s strategy. For he appearsto think that if a thing, x, has an essence, then, if it is this very thing, x,that is both F and not-F, it is possible to distinguish a particular respect inwhich it is either F or not-F but not both F and not-F. In other words,<strong>Aristotle</strong> thinks that we are entitled to be confident that, when it appearsthat a single thing, x, is at once F and not-F, then, if it is this very thing, x,that is both F and not-F, we can distinguish a respect in which it is F and adifferent respect in which it is not-F. And he thinks that what entitles us tothis confidence is, precisely, the view that x is a determinate and welldefinedthing—a thing that has an essence.Perhaps the cloud example may help to illustrate this strategy.Evidently, a particular cloud may look both round and not-round, and itmay be difficult or impossible to distinguish a respect in which it is roundand a respect in which it is not-round. Must we conclude that the cloud isat once round and not-round, and that this is a true contradiction? Wecannot directly conclude this. We can conclude this only if we argue thateither (option 1) the cloud is both round and not-round in one and the samerespect; or (option 2) although it is this very cloud that is both round andnot-round, still it is not possible to distinguish a respect in which it isround and a different respect in which it is not round. Evidently the formeroption will not be at all attractive. For it is difficult to see how one and the