Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

PHENOMENALISM AND RELATIVISM 167argument in a moment.) We may say that his aim here is not so muchdirectly to argue against certain views, as diagnostic, i.e. to trace the sourceof certain views and the best line of reasoning that can be set out insupport of them—and especially of the denial of PNC and PNC-M.It is important to recognize that although <strong>Aristotle</strong> offers variousobjections to phenomenalism and relativism, they are not really intended asdirect arguments against these views. For his objections largely presupposea number of his opposing views; indeed they largely amount to no more thana short summary statement of his opposing views. So if his aim weredirectly to argue against phenomenalism and relativism, he wouldmanifestly have begged the question against them. But we have seen that,in his defence of PNC, he is especially concerned not to beg the questionagainst those who deny PNC; he wants, on the contrary, to conduct theargument against those who deny PNC by relying as far as possible onshared assumptions.His response to phenomenalism is conducted not by concentratingdirectly on the statement and formulation of this view, but byconcentrating rather on the source of this view, i.e. the best line ofreasoning in its defence. But he will argue that an important part of thesource of phenomenalism is a certain extreme view about the nature of allthings: all things change always and in every way, and nothing is constantabout anything (see 1010 a 7ff.; we will return to this shortly). So it is inthis way, apparently, that things are radically indeterminate; they areradically indeterminate because they change always and in every way andnothing is constant about them. But his response here (in IV. 5–6) tophenomenalism, and in particular to the view that all things are radicallychanging and radically indeterminate, consists largely in his stating hisopposing views about all things and about changing things in particular(see 1010 a 15–35). For he asserts that a process of change presupposes thatthere is something constant that underlies the change (1010 a 16–22), andthat although things may constantly change in virtually every way, there isa crucial way in which they are changeless: things are changeless in respectof their form (eidos, 1010 a 22–25).We may wonder what the point is of his stating his opposing account ofchange and changing things, if it is not directly to argueagainst phenomenalism, relativism and their source or sources. But here weshould note how he concludes this response to phenomenalism and to theconception of change that leads to phenomenalism: