Aristotle on Metaphysics(2004) - Bibotu.com

ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS 19why things as we conceive them have an essence is that the thingsthemselves have an essence, and he challenges the opponent to offer abetter explanation (see Chapter 6, especially §5).Finally, it is important that any concern that we may have aboutessentialism should be a specific and well-articulated one. After all,essentialism can be formulated in a way that ought not to be a cause ofgeneral concern. For at its root, essentialism is the view that, with regard toany thing that we are thinking of, it is always appropriate to ask, ‘What isthis very thing?’ One reason why this question ought not to be a cause ofgeneral concern is that this question, precisely, does not beg any questions,i.e. it does not presuppose anything that can be questioned. For example,we might think that this question, ‘What is this very thing, x?’,presupposes that there really is such a thing, x, and that it is what it isindependently of us. But this would be a mistake. For example, if we ask,‘What is this very thing, a goatstag?’, we may answer that a goatstag is,precisely, an imaginary being; and we may use this answer, for example, toargue that we are at considerable liberty to suppose that a goatstag is as weimagine it to be, because it is, precisely, an imaginary being. Or again, ifwe ask ‘What is this very thing, art?’, we may answer (rightly or wrongly)that art is, precisely, what we call art But to assess such an answer, or evento arrive at it, we will have to ask the question, ‘What is this very thing,art?’ So this Socratic type question, ‘What is this very thing, x?’, is perhapsa truly radical question, i.e. one that it is always appropriate to ask andthat does not presuppose anything.6The structure and unity of the Metaphysics<strong>Aristotle</strong> did not write the Metaphysics as a single work, and even theindividual books (or sets of books) in it may not be finished works. Partlybecause of this, the question, what is the structure of the Metaphysics andto what extent does the Metaphysics amount to a single unified project?, isespecially difficult to answer. On primarily textual grounds, i.e. grounds thatare largely independent of issues of interpretation, the following isrelatively uncontroversial. First, books I, III and IV are written togetherand intended to form a relatively continuous work (book II is a laterinsertion). Second, books VII, VIII and IX, the so-called central books ofthe Metaphysics, are likewise written together and intended to form arelatively continuous work. Third, book XII is written as a largely selfcontainedwork which can, at least to a large extent, stand on its own.Fourth, books XIII and XIV are written together and intended to form a